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NOTES

SERIOUS MISCHIEFS: EXXON MOBIL CORP. v.
ALLAPATTAH

SERVICES, INC., SUPPLEMENTAL

JURISDICTION, AND BREAKING THE
PROMISE OF FINLEY
Brian E. Foster*
The constitution declares, that it is mandatory to the legislature,
that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to controversies "between citizens of different states"; and it is somewhat singular, that the jurisdiction actually conferred on the courts of the
United States should have stopped so far short of the constitutional
extent. That serious mischiefs have already arisen, and must continually arise from the present very limited jurisdiction of these courts,
is most manifest to all those, who are conversant with the adminis1
tration of justice. But we cannot help them.

*
Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2007; B.A., Political
Science, Michigan State University, 1995. I would like to acknowledge my debt and
gratitude to Professor Amy Coney Barrett for her advice and guidance on this Note
and a great many other topics; thanks also to Professor Joseph P. Bauer and to G.
David Mathues for extremely helpful comments and suggestions. This Note is
dedicated to the three most important women in my life, the reasons for everything I
do: my wife, Susan, and my daughters, Faith and Lexi. I'm sorry I missed so many
bedtimes, but now I'm coming home to eat cookies and drink milk.
This Note won the 2006 James William Moore Federal Practice Award from
LexisNexis for the outstanding student paper on federal civil practice and procedure.
I White v. Fenner, 29 F. Cas. 1015, 1015-16 (C.C.R.I. 1818) (No. 17,547). While
the opinion in this case is unsigned, Justice Joseph Story is considered to be its author. See RIcHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 334 n.4 (5th ed. 2003); David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of
Congress' Power Regarding the JudicialBranch, 1999 BYU L. REv. 75, 135.
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INTRODUCTION

In Finley v. United States,2 the Supreme Court brought two divergent and inconsistent lines of cases crashing together. One line
traced its ancestry to Ex parte Bollman3 and stood for the proposition
that the federal courts are of limited jurisdiction, unable to act unless
expressly authorized by an Act of Congress. The other line, descended from Osborn v. Bank of the United States,4 established the principle that once a federal court had jurisdiction over one part of a case,
the court would not lose jurisdiction if it heard other claims in the
case that could not independently be brought into federal court. For
nearly two hundred years, these two lines evolved separately, becoming more and more at odds with one another. The Court read express
statutory grants ofjurisdiction narrowly, while simultaneously developing common law doctrines to permit federal courts to decide claims
that fell outside those narrow confines. Finley finally acknowledged
the inherent logical contradiction.5 In curtailing the expansive Osborn
line, the Finley Court committed to using "a background of clear interpretive rules, so that [Congress] may know the effect of the language
6
it adopts."
Faced with the possibility that Finley's ruling might severely hinder the ability of federal courts to resolve cases efficiently, Congress
hastily passed a law intended to overturn Finley and provide the statutory basis for "supplemental" jurisdiction over nonfederal claims
closely related to other claims that can be validly heard in federal
court. 7 But this statute raised new questions of its own, which plagued

the federal courts of appeals for fifteen years and led to a deep circuit
split on the precise meaning and effect of the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
When it agreed to consolidate and hear the cases Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc. and Ortega v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc.,8 the
Supreme Court had an opportunity to remain true to its promise in
Finley to apply the "clear interpretive rules" upon which it said Con2 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
3 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).
4 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). The Finley Court did not mention Osborn, but
in an earlier case, the Court acknowledged Osborn as the patriarch of this strand. See
Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 6-7, 13-16 (1976).
5 Finley, 490 U.S. at 556 ("[O]ur cases do not display an entirely consistent approach with respect to the necessity that jurisdiction be explicitly conferred.").
6 Id.
7 SeeJudicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 310, 104 Stat.
5089, 5113-14 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000)).
8 125 S.Ct. 2611 (2005).
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gress could rely when it passed the supplemental jurisdiction statute.
In its decision, the Court settled one of the most contentious issues
arising from the supplemental jurisdiction statute, but in doing so, it
compromised the "clear interpretive rules" it had committed to use.
The Court thus broke its Finley promise-ironically, while interpreting
the very statute that had been passed in Finley's wake.
This Note explores the "serious mischiefs" 9 that evolved out of
the divergent line of jurisdictional cases, became codified in § 1367,
and were reborn in Allapattah. Part I examines the narrow limits the
Supreme Court has placed on inferior federal courts through its interpretation of congressional grants of jurisdiction, the much more expansive doctrine it developed to permit courts to hear supplemental
claims despite the lack of statutory authorization, and the Court's reasoning in Finley, in which the mischiefs were laid bare and the Court
called upon Congress to act. Part II recounts the congressional attempt to overturn the result in Finley and codify the prior practice,
mischiefs and all, and describes the new set of serious mischiefs resulting from the "effect of the language [Congress] adopt[ed]."1O Part III
then thoroughly analyzes the Court's opinion in Allapattah, using the
Court's treatment of the complete diversity rule to reveal its abandonment not only of the Finley promise, but also of the very rationale the
Court employed to decide the case. Finally, Part IV examines the feasibility of various possible solutions to the problem of authorizing supplemental jurisdiction while simultaneously limiting the reach of
federal judicial power, concluding that regardless of the specific legislative fix, if the Court will not honor its commitment to provide clear
interpretive rules for Congress, then Congress should provide clear
statutory rules for the Court.
I.

SERIOUS MISCHIEFS EVOLVED: ORIGINAL AND SUPPLEMENTAL

JURISDICTION PRIOR TO 1990

Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution provides
nine heads ofjurisdiction for the federal courts.' l The First Congress
9
10

White v. Fenner, 29 F. Cas. 1015, 1016 (C.C.R.I. 1818) (No. 17,547).
Finley, 490 U.S. at 556.

11 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; to all Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; to Controversies between two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State;
between Citizens of different States; between Citizens of the same State claiming
Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof,
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created the inferior courts of the federal judiciary with the passage of
the Judiciary Act of 1789, which included specific statutory grants of
jurisdiction according to the various heads provided in the Constitution.12 In early cases interpreting the scope of these grants, the Supreme Court read them very narrowly. 13 The reasoning behind this
construction was that Congress, having discretionary power to create
the lower federal courts, necessarily also had power to vest those
courts with as little or as much jurisdiction as it chose, up to the limit
specified in Article III. Thus, any statutory grant of jurisdiction must
be presumed to have vested only the specific and narrowjurisdictional
power prescribed by its terms; absent a statutory grant, a federal court
simply has no power to act because it has not been authorized by Congress to do so. This fundamental principle of construction has guided
the Court's interpretation of federal jurisdiction ever since.

and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects."). This Note is principally concerned with
jurisdiction between "citizens of different States." 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a) (1) (2000).
While the supplemental jurisdiction statute also has implications for alienage jurisdiction, see id. § 1332(a)(2)-(3), they are beyond the scope of this Note.
12 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 9, 11, 1 Stat. 73, 76-79 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). Notably, the original Judiciary Act did
not provide a statutory basis for federal question jurisdiction. It was not until 1875
that Congress authorized judicial action under that jurisdictional head. SeeJudiciary
Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(2000)); James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals,Article Ill Courts, and the JudicialPower of
the United States, 118 I-IARv. L. REV. 643, 730 (2004). But see David E. Engdahl, Federal
Question JurisdictionUnder the 1789JudiciaryAct, 14 OKLA. Clrv U. L. REV. 521, 521-22
(1989) (arguing that the original Judiciary Act did provide for federal jurisdiction
over all cases arising under federal law).
13 See, e.g., M'Intire v. Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 504, 505-06 (1813) (holding
that the circuit courts' mandamus power under the Judiciary Act extended only to
cases already encompassed by other jurisdictional grants in the Act); United States v.
Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 33 (1812) (holding that inferior federal courts had
no power to assume jurisdiction beyond the specific limits placed on them by Congress); Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dal].) 8, 11 (1799) (establishing the presumption that federal courts must be satisfied that statutory jurisdictional
requirements are met rather than assuming jurisdiction is proper); see also FALLON ET
AL., supra note 1, at 319; Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority To Regulate the Jurisdiction of the
FederalCourts, 95 HARv. L. REV. 17, 33-36 (1981) (noting that both Congress and the
Supreme Court have understood Congress's discretion to create inferior federal
courts to carry with it the discretion to grant only portions of Article III jurisdiction in
the inferior courts it creates).
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Very Limited Jurisdiction: The Complete Diversity and Amount-inControversy Requirements

1. The Complete Diversity Rule
Whether following this principle, considering the apparent purposes of diversity, or both, the Supreme Court opted for a narrow
statutory reading when it formulated the "complete diversity" rule in
the landmark case of Strawbridge v. Curtiss. 14 In Strawbridge, several

Massachusetts plaintiffs sued several Massachusetts defendants and
one Vermont defendant in Massachusetts federal court.1 5 The decision itself is brief and cryptic. 16 It appears the Court approached the
case by considering the underlying purpose for including diversity
cases among the heads of federal jurisdiction. The conventional view
is that diversity jurisdiction aims to provide a neutral forum where out17
of-state litigants can be free from local bias toward in-state litigants.
Thus, Chief Justice John Marshall's opinion held that each plaintiff
must be independently capable of bringing the case in federal court
against each defendant;' 8 in other words, each plaintiff must be of
diverse citizenship from each defendant, such that each and every
pairing of plaintiff and defendant would satisfy the statutory requirement that the parties be "citizens of different states."
The precise wording of the statutory grant of diversity jurisdiction
has changed over the years, but the core phrase "citizens of different
states" has consistently been construed, ever since Strawbridge, to demand complete diversity in most cases. 19 There are, however, some
exceptions.
14
15

7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
Id. at 267.

16 See Arthur D. Wolf, Comment on the Supplemental-Jurisdiction Statute: 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367, 74 IND. L.J. 223, 232 (1998).
17 The original grant of diversity jurisdiction required that the plaintiff be a citizen of the state where the suit was brought. SeeJudiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1
Stat. 73, 78 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000)) (granting jurisdiction over
suits that exceed "the sum or value of five hundred dollars" and are "between a citizen
of the State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another State"). But see Henry
J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARv. L. REv. 483, 495-97
(1928) (arguing that the true purpose of diversity jurisdiction was to provide out-ofstate creditors a more favorable tribunal than the generally pro-debtor state courts);
infra Part IV.A (examining the effectiveness of diversity jurisdiction in protecting outof-state litigants).
18 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) at 267-68.
19 See, e.g.,
Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 187 (1990); Smith v. Sperling,
354 U.S. 91, 93 (1957); Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 71 (1939);
Camp v. Gress, 250 U.S. 308, 312-13 (1919); Smith v. Lyon, 133 U.S. 315, 318-20
(1890); Marshall v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 57 U.S. (16. How.) 314, 339-42 (1854).
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First, the Supreme Court has held, absent any statutory direction,
that class actions in federal court need only achieve complete diversity
20
between the named class representatives and the opposing parties.
Unnamed class members are not considered in determining whether
or not the requisite diversity of citizenship exists. The Court reasoned
that only the named representatives are truly part of the Article III
case at hand, so only their citizenship, and not that of other class
21
members, should matter for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction.
Second, Congress in 1917 passed legislation permitting interpleader jurisdiction in the federal courts when minimal diversity is
present, i.e., when any plaintiff is of diverse citizenship from any defendant. 22 The constitutionality of this legislation turned on whether
the complete diversity rule in Strawbidge was an interpretation of the
diversity jurisdiction grant in Article III of the Constitution, or merely
of the statutory language of the original Judiciary Act authorizing such
jurisdiction in the federal courts. In 1967, the Supreme Court finally
resolved the question by holding that the Strawbridge complete diversity rule is an interpretation of statutory language, and not a requirement of the Constitution.2 3 Thus, the minimal diversity required by
the interpleader statute is sufficient to invoke the diversity jurisdiction
provided by the Constitution.
Third, Congress passed the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
(CAFA),2 4 which significantly amends § 1332 to provide a statutory basis for federal jurisdiction over certain class action lawsuits. 25 Generally, class actions can invoke federal jurisdiction under CAFA if they
(1) are multistate in scope; 26 (2) present an aggregate 27 amount in
20
21
22
U.S.C.

Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
Id. at 367.
Federal Interpleader Act, ch. 113, 39 Stat. 929 (1917) (current version at 28
§§ 1335, 1397, 2361 (2000)); see RICHARD D. FREER & WENDY COLLINS PERDUE,
CIVIL PROCEDURE 789 (4th ed. 2005).
23 State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967).
24 Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4. (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453,
1711-1715).
25 28 U.S.C.A § 1332(d) (West Supp. 2006).
26 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(3)-(5). The intricacies of CAFA, designed to ensure
that only truly multistate class actions fall within its province, are largely beyond the
scope of this Note. For a preliminary discussion of how CAFA changes the landscape
for class action litigation generally, see Steven B. Hantler & Robert E. Norton, Coupon
Settlements: The Emperor's Clothes of Class Actions, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1343, 1357-58
(2005); David F. Herr & Michael C. McCarthy, The Class Action FairnessAct of 2005Congress Again Wades into Complex Litigation Management Issues, 228 F.R.D. 673, 676-86
(2005); Mark Moller, The Rule of Law Problem: UnconstitutionalClass Actions and Options
forReform, 28 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 855, 885-92 (2005); Anthony Rollo & Gabriel A.

2oo6]

SERIOUS

MISCHIEFS

201 9

controversy of at least $5 million; and (3) are between minimally di28
verse named parties.
2.

The Amount-in-Controversy Requirement

In addition to diversity of citizenship, the statutory grant of diversity jurisdiction has also always required that the matter in controversy
exceed a certain dollar amount. Originally $500, this amount has
been increased several times, and currently stands at $75,000.29 The
Supreme Court has held, analogous to the Strawbridge rule regarding
diversity, that each individual plaintiff must independently meet the
amount-in-controversy threshold; aggregation of several plaintiffs'
claims to reach the threshold is not allowed. 30 Moreover, this rule
applied even if one plaintiff could meet the required amount threshold but other plaintiffs could not. In Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc.,3 1 the
Supreme Court refused to allow additional plaintiffs whose claims did
not meet the then-required amount of $3000 to join their claims with
another plaintiff whose claims were sufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction. 32 Curiously, in 1973 the Court extended this nonaggregation
principle to class actions in Zahn v. InternationalPaper Co.3 3 Although
the question was presented to the Court in terms of pendentjurisdic-

Crowson, Mapping the New Class Action Frontier-A Primer on the Class Action FairnessAct
and Amended FederalRule 23, 59 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 11, 13-22 (2005).

27 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(6). By permitting aggregation, CAFA significantly
changes the prior doctrine with respect to the amount-in-controversy requirement.
See infra Part I.A.2.

28 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d) (2) (A). Thus, CAFA partially supersedes Ben-Hur because it would permit diversity jurisdiction over class actions where any named representative is diverse from any opposing party, whereas Ben-Hur required complete
diversity among all named parties. See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S.
356, 363-64 (1921).
29 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000).
30 Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 336 (1969) ("By 1916 this Court was able to
say . . . that it was 'settled doctrine' that separate and distinct claims could not be
aggregated to meet the required jurisdictional amount." (quoting Pinel v. Pinel, 240
U.S. 594, 596 (1916))); Troy Bank v. G.A. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39, 40 (1911)
("When two or more plaintiffs, having separate and distinct demands, unite for convenience and economy in a single suit, it is essential that the demand of each be of the
requisite jurisdictional amount .....
31
32
33

306 U.S. 583 (1939).
Id. at 589.
414 U.S. 291, 299-301 (1973).
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tion,3 4 the majority opinion resolved the case on original jurisdiction
35
terms by invoking the Clark rule as controlling precedent.
Not only did this rationale needlessly confuse the distinction between original and pendent jurisdiction, it also created an arbitrary
inconsistency in the determination of original jurisdiction for class actions. As noted, in assessing the diversity of parties to a class action,
the court considers the citizenship of only the named representatives
of the class; in determining the amount in controversy, however, each
member of the class must independently satisfy the statutory requirement.36 This makes it "difficult to bring a class action in federal
court," since many class actions arise under state rather than federal
law and involve thousands of class members, each of whom has suffered a relatively small amount in damages.3 7 The practical effect of
Zahn, then, was to deny federal diversity jurisdiction to virtually all
class actions that did not qualify for federal question jurisdiction, even
if the parties satisfied the Ben-Hur requirement of complete diversity.
Original jurisdiction in diversity cases is thus determined by both
the diversity of the parties to the suit and the amount in controversy of
each plaintiffs claim. With respect to diversity of citizenship, each
plaintiff must be of diverse citizenship from each defendant, subject
to the exceptions for interpleader and class actions. If inclusion or
joinder of a particular party would run afoul of the Strawbridge rule,
then either that party cannot be joined or must be removed from the
action, or the entire case must be dismissed for lack of original jurisdiction. 38 With respect to the amount in controversy, each individual
plaintiff must allege claims sufficient to satisfy the minimum amount
in controversy provided by statute. Again, if a particular party's claims
cannot meet the required threshold, the party or the entire case must
be dismissed. By dismissing parties or cases that do not meet the established requirements for diversity jurisdiction, federal courts ensure
that, pursuant to the narrow interpretation of federal judicial power,
they only hear cases over which they are duly authorized to exercise
original jurisdiction.
34 See id. at 305 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Richard D. Freer, Toward a Principled
Statutory Approach to SupplementalJurisdictionin Diversity of Citizenship Cases, 74 IND. L.J.
5, 19-20 (1998).
35 Zahn, 414 U.S. at 300-01 (majority opinion).
36 See supra Part I.A.1.
37 FREER & PERDUE, supra note 22, at 839.
38 While dismissal of diversity-destroying parties is almost always a viable option,
some courts may dismiss the entire case on the theory that the nondiverse party has
"contaminated" the entire action. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc.,
125 S. Ct. 2611, 2617 (2005); infra Part III.A.
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Trying To Help Them: Supplemental JurisdictionDoctrine
Prior to § 1367

1. Pendent Jurisdiction
In contrast to its very narrow interpretation ofjudicial power with
respect to the original jurisdiction granted by Congress, the Supreme
Court employed a very broad understanding of the fundamental constitutional power to decide "Cases [and] Controversies '39 as a general
matter. Even as the Supreme Court was carefully parsing the jurisdiction statutes to deduce such principles as the Strawbridgecomplete diversity rule and the Clark nonaggregation rule, it was developing a set
of common law rules enabling federal courts to hear claims over
which they could not establish original jurisdiction, but that were substantially related to a claim that does fall within the narrow understanding of a statutory grant. The leading case, United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs,40 held that when jurisdictionally insufficient claims "derive from
a common nucleus of operative fact" with claims that do satisfy jurisdictional requirements, "[supplemental] jurisdiction, in the sense of
judicial power, exists" to hear all claims that "comprise [ ] but one constitutional 'case.' "41
Gibbs established the contours of what was then known as "pendent" or "pendent claim" jurisdiction. 42 The plaintiff invoked federal
44
question jurisdiction 43 to bring suit against the defendant union.
Gibbs also asserted a state law claim against the union arising out of
the same set of facts. 45 The Court's holding meant that the federal
district court could adjudicate both the federal and state claim together in one case, even though the state claim would not have been
46
sufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction on its own.
The Gibbs Court further held that, despite the power to hear such
pendent claims, the district court had discretion to refuse to hear the
39 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
40 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
41 Id. at 725.
42 See id.
43 Interestingly, neither the plaintiff nor the Court invoked the general federal
question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000); the majority opinion noted that "jurisdiction was premised on allegations of secondary boycotts under" section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 720; see also Labor Management
Relations Act, ch. 120, § 303, 61 Stat. 136, 158-59 (1947) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 187 (2000)).
44 Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 717.
45 Id. at 717-18.
46 Gibbs and the union were both citizens of the State of Tennessee; thus, there
was no diversity of citizenship. Id. at 721.

2022

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81:5

claims for a variety of reasons. 4 7 This discretion permitted the district
courts wide latitude in evaluating supplemental jurisdiction on a case48
by-case basis.
Gibbs was thus a remarkable expansion of federal jurisdiction.
The Court assumed the power to resolve nonfederal claims related to
a case properly in federal court, 49 despite the absence of an express
statutory grant to that effect. Instead, the Court reasoned that Congress intended for federal courts to have such expansive pendentjurisdiction unless there was an express statutory denial of that
jurisdiction. 50 This idea ran directly counter to the fundamental principle that federal courts were powerless unless Congress bestowed authority on them through a statute. That principle, in turn, was further
limited by the Court's narrow interpretation of statutory grants of jurisdiction. The Gibbs Court took a very different approach, skirting
past the question of whether there was a statutory grant in support of
pendent jurisdiction, and instead holding as a matter of Article III
judicial power that federal courts could hear and decide nonfederal
51
claims if they are sufficiently related to a federal case or controversy.
The only limits on that power, according to Gibbs, are the require52
ment of a relational nexus and the discretion of the district courts.
Thus, narrow interpretations of statutory grants of jurisdiction could
conceivably be circumvented easily under the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction.
Later cases sought to contain or distinguish Gibbs. One way the
Court limited Gibbs was to narrow the reach of "pendent party" jurisdiction. Pendent party jurisdiction involved the assertion of
47 Id. at 726.
48 Id. at 726-27 (discussing judicial economy, convenience, fairness to litigants,
dismissal of federal claims prior to trial, the substantial predominance of state issues,
and the likelihood ofjury confusion as reasons for federal courts to decline to exercise pendent jurisdiction).
49 Although the federal claim in Gibbs invoked the federal question jurisdiction
of § 1331, the language in the decision was sufficiently broad to reach all forms of
federal jurisdiction, including diversity of citizenship. See Owen Equip. & Erection
Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 371 n.10 (1978) (assuming, without deciding, that Gibbs
extends to diversity cases); id. at 379 (White, J., dissenting) ("Although the specific
facts of [ Gibbs] concerned a state claim that was said to be pendent to a federal-question claim, the Court's language and reasoning were broad enough to cover the instant factual situation . .

").

50 Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 722-25; see Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976)
("Before it can be concluded that [supplemental] jurisdiction exists, a federal court
must satisfy itself not only that Art. III permits it, but that Congress in the statutes
conferring jurisdiction has not expressly or by implication negated its existence.").
51 Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725.
52 Id. at 725-26.
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nonfederal claims by the plaintiff, not against the original defendant
(over whom federal jurisdiction did exist with respect to the plaintiff's
federal claim), but against another defendant, not otherwise party to
the suit and against whom no valid federal claim was asserted. 53 Pendent party jurisdiction extended the reach of federal courts beyond
not just the claims over which they have jurisdiction, but parties as well.
In Aldinger v. Howard,54 the Supreme Court denied pendent party
jurisdiction against a municipal government when the "host" federal
claim arose under the civil rights laws. 5 5 Because those laws5 6 at the

time were construed to expressly deny federal jurisdiction over local
governments, the Court held that pendent party jurisdiction could
not be used to bring a related state law claim against the county; the
statutes' limitation of jurisdiction as an original matter also operated
to limit pendent jurisdiction. 57 Nevertheless, the Court's analysis in
Aldinger accepted the general premise of pendent party jurisdiction, at
least in those instances where (as noted in Gibbs) there was no reason
to believe, as there was in Aldinger, that Congress had denied the federal courts power to resolve pendent claims and claims over pendent
58
parties.
2.

Ancillary Jurisdiction

Ancillary jurisdiction, on the other hand, was another supplemental jurisdiction concept that predated Gibbs. If pendent jurisdiction was conventionally understood to describe nonfederal claims
asserted by a plaintiff "pendent to" her federal claim, then ancillary
jurisdiction described claims asserted by parties other than the original plaintiff "ancillary to" the original plaintiffs federal claims. For
example, ancillary jurisdiction was used to extend federal jurisdiction
over claims by defendants against impleaded third parties, crossclaims between co-defendants, counterclaims against the original
plaintiff, and claims by or against indispensable or intervening parties,
when there was no independent basis for federal jurisdiction over
such claims. 59 Similar to the pendent jurisdiction concept developed
in Gibbs, the objective of ancillary jurisdiction was to maximize judicial
53

See Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 9-10.

54 427 U.S. 1.
55 Id. at 16-19.
56 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a) (3) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
57 See Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 17.
58 Id. at 18.
59 See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 375 & n.18 (1978)
(citing cases).
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economy and provide for the efficient resolution of all related claims
60
in a single action.
In Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger,61 the Supreme Court
limited the use of ancillary jurisdiction by plaintiffs in actions based
on diversity of citizenship. 62 The Kroger plaintiff was an Iowa citizen
who brought suit in federal court against a Nebraska defendant, which
in turn impleaded an Iowa corporation. 63 The plaintiff then
amended her complaint to name the Iowa corporation as a co-defendant, and the district court, relying on Gibbs, permitted the joinder
64
despite the absence of diversity between the two parties.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that such a broad application of ancillary jurisdiction could permit a plaintiff to "defeat the statutory requirement of complete diversity by the simple expedient of
suing only those defendants who were of diverse citizenship and waiting for them to implead nondiverse defendants. '65 Despite the
Court's belief that "Congress did not intend to confine the jurisdiction of federal courts so inflexibly that they are unable to protect legal
66
rights or effectively to resolve an entire, logically entwined lawsuit,"
it refused to allow ancillary jurisdiction over "a plaintiffs cause of action against a citizen of the same State in a diversity case."'6 7 To do so
"would simply flout the congressional command. ' 66
It is worthwhile to note that in both Aldinger and Kroger, the
Court characterized the challenges presented under the pendent and
ancillary jurisdiction concepts as "two species of the same generic
problem: Under what circumstances may a federal court hear and de69
cide a state-law claim arising between citizens of the same State?
That is to say, the entire problem of supplemental jurisdiction arises
only when there is no independent basis for jurisdiction over the
claim. If the claim meets the statutory requirements under § 1331,
then it is a federal claim and the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction
need not be consulted. Similarly, if the claim is between citizens of
different states and is of the requisite amount in controversy, then the
60

See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 378-80 (1994).

61

437 U.S. 365.

62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
profit

Id. at 377.
Id. at 367-69.
Id. at 369.
Id. at 374.
Id. at 377.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 370 (citing Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 13 (1976) ("[T]here is little
in attempting to decide ... whether there are any 'principled' differences be-

tween pendent and ancillary jurisdiction .

")).
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federal courts have original jurisdiction under § 1332. It is only when
the claim arises between citizens of the same state, and does not present a federal question or any other independent basis for federal jurisdiction, that supplemental jurisdiction-whether pendent or
ancillary-comes into play.
3.

Finley v. United States Threatens To Eviscerate Supplemental
Jurisdiction

In 1989, the Supreme Court was faced with a question expressly
left open by the Court in Aldingei70 : whether, in an action against one
defendant over which federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction, the
plaintiff could use pendent party jurisdiction to assert a state law claim
against a nondiverse defendant. 71 Petitioner Barbara Finley sued the
United States on a claim over which the federal district court had exclusive jurisdiction under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) .72 She
amended her complaint to assert state law claims against a city government and local public utility, both of which were deemed citizens of
the same state (California) as Finley.73 The district court permitted
the joinder of these claims and parties, relying on Gibbs for
74
justification.
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that nothing in the FTCA,
nor in any other jurisdictional statute, gave federal courts the authority to exercise jurisdiction over nonfederal claims by plaintiffs that introduce new parties to the suit. 75 "[W] ith respect to the addition of

parties, as opposed to the addition of only claims, we will not assume
that the full constitutional power has been congressionally authorized,
and will not read jurisdictional statutes broadly. ' 76 The Finley majority
read Aldinger to support its contention that pendent party jurisdiction
does not automatically follow from Gibbs, but rather must also rely on
"'careful attention to the relevant statutory language.'- 77 Finding
sig70 427 U.S. at 18 ("Other statutory grants and other alignments of parties and
claims might call for a different result. When the grant of jurisdiction to a federal
court is exclusive, for example, as in the prosecution of tort claims against the United
States under 28 U.S.C. § 1346, the argument of judicial economy and convenience
can be coupled with the additional argument that only in a federal court may all of
the claims be tried together.").
71 See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 547 (1989).
72 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2000).
73 Finley, 490 U.S. at 546.
74 Id. at 546-47.
75 Id. at 549-51.
76

Id. at 549.

77

Id. at 550 (quoting Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 17 (1976)).
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nificance in the fact that Zahn, Aldinger,and Kroger all involved "claims
[against] added parties over whom no independent basis of jurisdiction exists, ' 78 the Court read the FTCA narrowly: 'Just as the statutory
provision 'between . . .citizens of different States' has been held to
mean citizens of different States and no one else, so also here we conclude that 'against the United States' means against the United States
and no one else."'79 Thus, the Finley Court read the relevant jurisdictional statute as expressly denying jurisdiction over other parties-just
as Kroger held with regard to diversity of citizenship and § 1332,80 Aldingerheld with regard to local governments and the civil rights laws,8 1
and Zahn held with regard to amount in controversy and § 1332.82
The Finley majority bookended its analysis with an acknowledgement of the tension between the Court's narrow and limited approach
to its interpretation of original jurisdiction on the one hand, and the
broad and expansive approach it has taken to supplemental jurisdiction doctrines on the other. Early in its opinion, the Court acknowledged the fundamental principle: "'[C]ourts which are created by
written law, and whose jurisdiction is defined by written law, cannot
transcend that jurisdiction.'"83 More specifically, "'The Constitution
must have given to the [inferior federal] court[s] the capacity to take
jurisdiction], and an act of Congress must have supplied it... To the
84
extent that such action is not taken, the power lies dormant.' ,,
In
concluding its opinion, the Finley majority described the "Gibbs line of
cases [as] a departure from prior practice," but declined to overturn
them. 85 Instead, the Court adhered to the Aldinger line limiting the
use of the Gibbs departure in pendent party cases.8 6 The Court refused to recognize pendent party jurisdiction in the absence of a specific statutory grant authorizing such jurisdiction, but invited
Congress to correct the Court's interpretation of the jurisdictional
8 7
statutes if it wished.
78

Id. at 551.

79

Id. at 552 (citation omitted).

80

See supra text accompanying notes 61-68.

81
82

See supra text accompanying notes 54-58.
See supra Part I.A.2.
83 Finley, 490 U.S. at 547 (quoting Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93
(1807)).
84

Id. at 548 (quoting Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 252 (1868)).

85
86

Id. at 556.
Id.

87

Id. ("Whatever we say regarding the scope ofjurisdiction conferred by a partic-

ular statute can of course be changed by Congress.").
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SERIOUS MISCHIEFS CODIFIED: CONGRESS ACCEPTS THE INVITATION
AND ENACTS §

1367

The reaction to Finley was swift.88 A Federal Courts Study Committee, already in existence pursuant to earlier judicial legislation,8 9
included in its final report to Congress a recommendation for dealing
with the Finley problem. 90 It noted the potential problems with the

reach of Finley's holding91 and suggested that "Congress expressly authorize federal courts to hear any claim arising out of the same 'transaction or occurrence' as a claim within federal jurisdiction, including

claims, within federal question jurisdiction, that require the joinder of
additional parties, namely, defendants against whom that plaintiff has
92
a closely related state claim."
A statutory provision that tracked this recommendation by speci-

fying that pendent party jurisdiction extended only to state law claims
closely related to claims presenting a true federal question would have
avoided uncertainty and controversy. 93 Unfortunately, the final version of the statute as passed was much less limited. Indeed, § 1367(a)
by its terms has been understood to codify fully the Gibbs holding that
88 See, e.g., Richard D. Freer, Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity: Life
After Finley and the SupplementalJurisdictionStatute, 40 EMORY L.J. 445, 469-71 (1991);
Thomas M. Mengler et al., Congress Accepts Supreme Court's Invitation To Codify SupplementalJurisdiction,74JUDICATURE 213, 213 (1991); Heather McDaniel, Note, Plugging
the "GapingHole" The Effect of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 on the Complete Diversity Requirement of 28
U.S.C. § 1332, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 1069, 1083 (1997).

89 Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702,
§§ 101-109, 102 Stat. 4642, 4644-45 (1988).
90 See FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, at 47-48 (1990) [hereinafter FCSC REPORT].
91 See id. at 47 ("[A] litigant with related claims against two different parties-one
within and one outside original federal jurisdiction-may have to choose between (1)
splitting the claims and bringing duplicative actions in state and federal courts; (2)
abandoning one of the claims altogether; or (3) filing the entire case in state court,
thus delegating the determination of federal issues to the state courts. The first alternative wastes judicial resources. The second is unfair to the claimant. The third
forces litigants to bring a wide variety of federal claims into the state courts and in
some cases is unavailable because federal jurisdiction over the federal aspect is
exclusive.").
92 Id. (emphasis added).
93 SeeJoan Steinman, Section 1367-Another Party Heard From, 41 EMORY L.J. 85,
91-92 (1992). But see Report to the Federal Courts Study Committee of the Subcommittee on the Role of the Federal Courts and Their Relation to the States, in 1 FED.
COURTS STUDY COMM., WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS 567-68 (1990)
(proposing draft statutory language that does not make these distinctions).
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supplemental jurisdiction extends to the limit of the Constitution.9 4
Moreover, the statute makes no distinction between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction, instead acknowledging the reality that they are
"two species of the same generic problem"9 5 and codifying both doctrines under the new term "supplemental jurisdiction. ''9 6 The last sentence of § 1367(a) expressly overrules Finley by providing for the
joinder or intervention of additional parties, and nothing at all in
§ 1367(a) itself limits the breadth of the statute. Thus, § 1367(a)
standing alone appears to authorize supplemental jurisdiction for any
claim at all that is "so related to claims in the action within ... original

jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under
'97
Article III of the United States Constitution.
Even Gibbs, of course, was not so unbridled an expansion of the
power of the federal courts. 98 Section 1367(c) of the supplemental
jurisdiction statute purports to codify the limitations in Gibbs, 99 just as
§ 1367(a) codifies the reach of Gibbs. While the language in
94 See, e.g., Gold v. Local 7 United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 159 F.3d
1307, 1309-10 (10th Cir. 1998); Rodriguez v. Doral Mortgage Corp., 57 F.3d 1168,
1175-76 (1st Cir. 1995); Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 109 (4th Cir. 1995);
Promisel v. First Am. Artificial Flowers, Inc., 943 F.2d 251, 254 (2d Cir. 1991); Sinclair
v. Soniform, Inc., 935 F.2d 599, 603 (3d Cir. 1991); Richard D. Freer, The Cauldron
Boils: Supplemental Jurisdiction,Amount in Controversy, and Diversity of Citizenship Class
Actions, 53 EMORY L.J. 55, 67, 81-82 (2004);John B. Oakley, Recent Statutory Changes in
the Law of FederalJurisdictionand Venue: The JudicialImprovements Acts of 1988 and 1990,
24 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 735, 763-65 (1991); James E. Pfander, Supplemental Jurisdiction
and Section 1367: The Casefor a Sympathetic Textualism, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 109, 142 &
n.127 (1999). The text of § 1367(a) provides:
Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have
original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction
over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such
original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy
under Article III of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000).
95 Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 370 (1978).
96 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
97 Id.
98 See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966).
99 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) ("The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if-(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or
claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has
dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.").
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§ 1367(a) and (c) does not exactly track the language from Gibbs, the
general consensus is that these two provisions together operate to
overturn Finley and restore Gibbs as the controlling doctrine for the
discretionary exercise of supplemental jurisdiction by the federal
courts. 100
That leaves the Kroger problem: how to codify supplemental jurisdiction in such a way as to prevent plaintiffs from using it to circumvent the limits placed by Congress and the courts on diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction. Congress's answer to this dilemma is contained in § 1367(b), which provides:
In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded solely on section 1332 of this title, the district courts
shall not have supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a) over
claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14, 19,
20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by
persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such
rules, or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such
rules, when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims
would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.101
Section 1367(b) thus applies to limit supplemental jurisdiction
only (1) when the original action arises under the diversity head of
jurisdiction; and (2) when the additional claims are made either by
plaintiffs against certain specified parties, or by persons who would be
joined as plaintiffs under Rules 19 or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 10 2 The final fragment of § 1367(b) further indicates that
supplemental jurisdiction is to be withheld from such claims only
when hearing them "would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332."'10
The meaning, effects, and implications of § 1367 have been hotly
debated from almost the moment it became law. 10 4 Because the Su100 See, e.g., Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1254 (6th
Cir. 1996); Freer, supra note 94, at 81; Pfander, supra note 94, at 121-22; McDaniel,
supra note 88, at 1083-84.
101 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b).
102 See McDaniel, supra note 88, at 1085-86.
103 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b).
104 See, e.g., Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Close Enough for Government
Work: What Happens When Congress Doesn't Do Its Job, 40 EMORY LJ. 1007 (1991);
Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Grasping at Burnt Straws: The Disaster of the
SupplementalJurisdictionStatute, 40 EMORY LJ. 963 (1991); Erwin Chemerinsky, RationalizingJurisdiction,41 EMORY L.J. 3 (1992); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Debate Over
§ 1367: Defining the Power To Define FederalJudicial Power, 41 EMORY L.J. 13 (1992);
Freer, supra note 88; Karen Nelson Moore, The Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute: An
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preme Court has at least nominally resolved the most fundamental
questions in the debate with its decision in Allapattah, there is little
need to rehash the arguments here. 0 5 It will, however, be helpful to
review the major contentions in order to better understand the significance of the Court's decision.
Professor Freer's initial article criticizing § 1367 identified ten potential problems with the statute.1 0 6 The last of his enumerated
problems involved the question ultimately resolved by the Court in
Allapattah: whether or not § 1367 overruled the Clark and Zahn rules
prohibiting jurisdiction over supplemental claims that do not meet
the amount-in-controversy requirement. 10 7 As Professor Freer noted,
the plain language of the statute would permit supplemental jurisdiction over such claims, 10 8 but "[b]uried in the legislative history.. . is a
disclaimer regarding class actions" which indicates that "the drafters
did not intend to affect the present jurisdictional standards for class
actions." 109

In response, three principal drafters of the statute acknowledged
the Zahn problem with § 1367 and wrote that " [i] t would have been
better had the statute dealt explicitly with this problem, and the legislative history was an attempt to correct the oversight." 1 10 Thus, from
the outset the question that eventually reached the Court in Allapattah
Important but Controversial Supplement to FederalJurisdiction, 41 EMORY L.J. 31 (1992);
Wendy Collins Perdue, The New SupplementalJurisdictionStatute-Flawed But Fixable, 41
EMORY L.J. 69 (1992); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. et al., A Coda on SupplementalJurisdiction,
40 EMORY L.J. 993 (1991); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. et al., Compounding or CreatingConfusion About SupplementalJurisdiction?A Reply to ProfessorFreer,40 EMORY LJ. 943 (1991)
[hereinafter Rowe et al., Reply]; Steinman, supra note 93.
105 Indeed, one writer observed several years ago that the raging debate had "destroyed most of a mid-sized forest," leaving "nothing new for anyone to say about
supplemental jurisdiction." Peter Raven-Hansen, The Forgotten Proviso of § 1367(b)
(And Why We Forgot), 74 IND. L.J. 197, 197 (1998).
106 Freer, supra note 88, at 474-86.
107 See id. at 485-86.
108 Id. at 485. Professor Freer's article discussed only the class action context. See
id. at 485-86.
109 Id. at 486. The legislative history for § 1367 states: "The section is not intended
to affect the jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 in diversity-only class actions, as those requirements were interpreted prior to Finley." H.R. REP.No. 101-734,
at 29 & n.17 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6875 (naming Ben-Hur
and Zahn as the requirements in question).
110 Rowe et al., Reply, supra note 104, at 960 n.90. The authors went on to note
that the conflict between the text and history "creates the delicious possibility that
despite Justice Scalia's opposition to the use of legislative history, he will have to look
to the history or conclude that section 1367 has wiped Zahn off the books." Id. That
§ 1367 "has wiped Zahn off the books" is, of course, precisely what the Court concluded in Allapattah, and Justice Scalia was part of the majority in that decision.
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pitted a textualist approach to § 1367 against one that prioritized the
legislative history.
More alarming to the three drafters, and squarely the focus of
this Note, is "section 1367(b)'s silence about supplemental jurisdiction over nondiverse parties proposed to be added after initial filing
as plaintiffs under Rule 20 (permissive joinder of parties)." 1 I The
drafters suggested that "[o]riginal filing of a diversity complaint by
two plaintiffs, one of them not of diverse citizenship from a defendant, remains barred by the complete diversity" rule, 112 but that
§ 1367(b) read literally would not prevent jurisdiction over such an
action. 113 The drafters could "only hope that the federal courts
[would] plug that potentially gaping hole in the complete diversity
requirement." 114
The hole would work like this: if a single plaintiff brings an action
against a diverse defendant that meets the amount-in-controversy requirement, then there is original jurisdiction over that action sufficient to satisfy the requirements of § 1332, and therefore of § 1367(a)
as well. That same section then authorizes supplemental jurisdiction
over other closely related claims, including claims that involve joinder
of additional parties. Thus, according to the terms of § 1367(a)
alone, federal courts would have supplemental jurisdiction over the
related claim of a co-plaintiff, even if that plaintiff is not diverse from
the original defendant.1 1 5 But § 1367(a) is limited by § 1367(b),
which withholds supplemental jurisdiction in certain circumstances
when original jurisdiction is founded on diversity and the exercise of
supplemental jurisdiction would be "inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332."116 Yet none of the specific cir111
112

Id.at961n.91.
Id. This Note argues that according to Allapattah'srationale, it is no longer so

clear that this is the case.

See infra Part III.C. While there may be some fine distinc-

tions between an original action including a nondiverse plaintiff and an original action that is completely diverse but is later amended to add a nondiverse plaintiff, this
Note considers these actions in tandem.
113 See Rowe et al., Reply, supra note 104, at 961 n.91. They suggested that federal
courts could plug the hole "either by regarding it as an unacceptable circumvention
of original diversity jurisdiction requirements, or by reference to the intent not to
abandon the complete diversity rule that is clearly expressed in the legislative history
of section 1367." Id.
114

Id.

115 Indeed, the co-plaintiff would have to be nondiverse for § 1367(a) to apply. If
the co-plaintiff was diverse, then there would be original jurisdiction over the claim
(assuming the requisite amount in controversy), and there would be no need to resort to supplemental jurisdiction.
116 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (2000).
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cumstances described in § 1367(b) cover the assertion of claims by a
plaintiff joined under Rule 20 against a single defendant.1 17 Thus,
§ 1367(a) grants supplemental jurisdiction, and nothing in § 1367(b)
takes it away, so the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is proper,
even though the action as a whole is plainly incompatible with the
complete diversity rule.
In this way, plaintiffs can easily circumvent the complete diversity
requirement of Strawbridge,at least in cases where there is only a single
defendant, simply by structuring the litigation in a way that meets the
complete diversity requirement initially, and then joining nondiverse
plaintiffs under Rule 20.118 This would seem to be much more of a
"simple expedient" than what the Court feared in Kroger,119 and yet it
emanates from the literal application of a statutory provision purported to codify Krogers diversity-based limits on supplemental
jurisdiction.
Again, the legislative history suggests an intent inconsistent with
the language of the statute:
In diversity-only actions the district courts may not hear plaintiffs'
supplemental claims when exercising supplemental jurisdiction
would encourage plaintiffs to evade the jurisdictional requirement
of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 by the simple expedient of naming initially only
those defendants whose joinder satisfies section 1332's requirements and later adding claims not within original federal jurisdiction against other defendants who have intervened or been joined
on a supplemental basis. In accord with case law, the subsection also
prohibits the joinder or intervention of persons a [sic] plaintiffs if
1 20
adding them is inconsistent with section 1332's requirements.
This language clearly indicates that there was no intent to permit
multiple plaintiffs to circumvent the complete diversity rule; combined with the legislative history regarding diversity-only class ac117 Section 1367(b) does prohibit supplemental jurisdiction over claims "by plaintiffs against persons made parties under ...Rule 20," id., which would seem to apply
to cases in which there are multiple defendants. But in cases with only a single defendant, Rule 20 is not implicated.
118 Alternatively, the plaintiffs could simply file the entire action and assert that
the diverse claim establishes original jurisdiction under § 1367(a), thus providing a
host claim to which supplemental jurisdiction over the nondiverse claim can attach.
Section 1367(a) would not require plaintiffs to take the interim steps of filing and
amending under this analysis. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
119 See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978); supra

notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
120

6875.

H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 29 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860,
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tions, 12 ' it would also seem that there was no intent to change the
rules regarding aggregation orjoinder of claims that do not independently satisfy the amount in controversy. The clash between the text
of the statute and the statement of intent in the legislative history
could not be plainer.
Not surprisingly, the federal circuit courts of appeals have arrived
at multiple conclusions to the question of whether § 1367 overruled
Zahn and Clark. A majority of the circuits ruling on the issue applied
the plain meaning of the statute to determine that it did indeed overrule Zahn and Clark.122 Beginning in 1998, however, three circuits
held that Zahn and Clark survived § 1367, purporting to reach this
result by a purely textual interpretation. 123 These courts interpreted
the phrase "any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction" in § 1367(a) to incorporate by reference the various nuances of original, pendent, and ancillary jurisdiction that existed prior
to Finley.1 24 According to this reading, an action consisting of multiple claims by plaintiffs, some of which did not meet the amount-incontroversy requirement, would not be a "civil action of which the
district courts have original jurisdiction," because the Zahn and Clark
rules requiring each plaintiff to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement would prohibit original jurisdiction over the entire case.
As a result, there would be no original jurisdiction to which supplemental jurisdiction could attach. 125 In addition, the Third Circuit
held in favor of keeping Zahn and Clark by going to the legislative
history despite acknowledging that "there is much to be said for [the]
view that the text [of § 1367] does not displace Zahn's ruling," because "this is one of those 'rare cases [in which] the literal application
121 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
122 See Olden v. LaFarge Corp., 383 F.3d 495, 502 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125
S. Ct. 2990 (2005); Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 333 F.3d 1248, 1256 (lth
Cir. 2003), affd sub nom. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611
(2005); Rosmer v. Pfizer, Inc., 263 F.3d 110, 114 (4th Cir. 2001); Gibson v. Chrysler
Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 934 (9th Cir. 2001); In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 607 (7th Cir. 1997); Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press
Mech., Inc., 77 F.3d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1996); In reAbbott Labs., 51 F.3d 524, 528-29
(5th Cir. 1995).
123 See Rosario Ortega v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc., 370 F.3d 124, 132-33 (1st Cir.
2004), rev'd sub nom. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs. Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611;
Trimble v. Asarco, Inc., 232 F.3d 946, 961 (8th Cir. 2000); Leonhardt v. W. Sugar Co.,
160 F.3d 631, 640 (10th Cir. 1998).
124 See Rosario Ortega, 370 F.3d at 135; Trmble, 232 F.3d at 961-62; Leonhardt, 160
F.3d at 640.

125 See Pfander, supra note 94, at 127-28 (describing the "sympathetic" reading of
the statute in detail).
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of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the inten12 6
tions of its drafters."'
In its 1999 Term, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
the deepening split among the circuits on this question.1 2 7 But because Justice O'Connor recused herself from the case, 12 8 the Court
could not form a majority and affirmed the circuit's result by an
equally divided Court.1 29 Thus, "[c]ourts, litigants, and scholars
would have to wait another five years for the Supreme Court to pro13 0
vide guidance."
III.

SERIOUS MISCHIEFS REBORN: THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
AND RATIONALE IN EXXON MOBIL CORP. v. ALLAPAITAH

SERVICES, INC.

For its 2004 Term, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in two
of the latest cases to address the § 1367 problem in the Zahn/Clark
context.1 31 The first case involved class action litigation arising under
state law against Exxon Mobil by more than 10,000 independent Exxon dealers in the State of Florida.1 3 2 The district court had determined that § 1367 overruled Zahn, and therefore certified the class
despite the fact that several of the dealers could not show claims meeting the $75,000 minimum. 133 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed, adopting the reasoning of the five other circuits that had
126 Meritcare Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214, 222 (3d Cir. 1999)
(third alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Sherman, 150 F.3d 306, 313
(3d Cir. 1998)).
127 Free v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 176 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 1999), affd per curiam by an
equally divided Court, 529 U.S. 333 (2000).
128 No official reason was given, but it appears thatJustice O'Connor owned stock
in one of the parties to the case. See Thomas E. Baker, Why We Call the Supreme Court
"Supreme": A Case Study on the Importance of Settling the National Law, 4 GREEN BAG 2d
129, 136 & n.34 (2001).
129 Free, 529 U.S. at 333.
130 Adam N. Steinman, Sausage-Making, Pigs' Ears, and CongressionalExpansions of
FederalJurisdiction:Exxon Mobil v. Allapattah and Its Lessons for the Class Action Fairness
Act, 81 WASH. L. REv. 279, 308 (2006).
131 Del Rosario Ortega v. Star Kist Foods, Inc., 370 F.3d 124 (1st Cir. 2004), rev'd
sub nom. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611; Allapattah
Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 333 F.3d 1248 (lth Cir. 2003), affd sub nom. Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611.
132 Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2615.
133 SeeAllapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 157 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1327 (S.D. Fla.
2001), affd, 333 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir.), aff[d sub nom. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah
Servs., Inc., 125 S.Ct. 2611.
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held the plain language of § 1367 abrogates
the Zahn rule against ag34
gregation of claims in class actions.
In the second case, a nine-year-old girl severely cut her hand
while opening a can of Star-Kist tuna. 1 35 She filed suit against the
136
company, and several of her family members joined related claims.
The district court ruled that none of the plaintiffs satisfied the
amount-in-controversy requirement and dismissed the case. 13 7 The
First Circuit partially overruled, finding that the girl herself had stated
a claim that met the $75,000 threshold, but the other plaintiffs had
not. 138 The First Circuit then considered whether § 1367 permitted
the other family members to obtain supplemental jurisdiction over
their claims, and held that it did not, following the logic of the circuits
that considered such jurisdictionally deficient claims to destroy original jurisdiction over the action. 139 Thus, the First Circuit concluded
that the injured girl's claim against Star-Kist could proceed, but joinder of the other family members' claims would destroy original juris40
diction entirely, so they could not be joined to the case."
A.

The JurisdictionActually Conferred: Analyzing the Statute

Justice Kennedy's majority opinion first reviewed the history of
supplemental jurisdiction and § 1367."" Then, turning to analysis,
the majority employed a methodology and structure that closely resembled § 1367 itself: the Court first established in extremely broad
terms an expansive principle of supplemental jurisdiction, but then
undercut that principle in an attempt to prevent it from obliterating
42
the complete diversity rule.
The majority began by emphasizing that jurisdictional statutes
were to receive no special treatment when being interpreted: "Ordinary principles of statutory construction apply."1 43 With that in mind,
134
135
136
137
2002),
Mobil
138
139
140
141
142
143

Allapattah, 333 F.3d at 1253-54.
Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2616.
Id.
Del Rosario Ortega v. Star Kist Foods, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 84, 92-95 (D.P.R.
affd in part, vacated in part, 370 F.3d 124 (1st Cir. 2004), rev'd sub nor. Exxon
Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611.
Rosario Ortega, 370 F.3d at 128-29.
Id. at 137-39.
See id. at 144.
Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2616-20.
See Steinman, supra note 130, at 313-14.
Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2620; see also id. ("We must not give jurisdictional stat-

utes a more expansive interpretation than their text warrants, but it is just as important not to adopt an artificial construction that is narrower than what the text
provides." (citation omitted) (citing Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 549, 556
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the Court described § 1367(a) as "a broad grant of supplemental jurisdiction over other claims within the same case or controversy, as long
as the action is one in which the district courts would have original
jurisdiction," 144 and then framed the question before the Court as
"whether a diversity case in which the claims of some plaintiffs satisfy
the amount-in-controversy requirement, but the claims of other plaintiffs do not, presents a 'civil action of which the district courts have
original jurisdiction.'"145 If it does, then so long as the Gibbs test
would treat all the claims as part of the same case or controversy
under Article III, § 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over the
otherwise jurisdictionally insufficient claims.1 46 If, on the other hand,
the case is not one of which district courts would have original jurisdiction, then § 1367 cannot operate because there is no original civil
147
action to which supplemental jurisdiction can attach.
In other words, the essential holding of the case-the answer to
the question before the Court-turns on the interpretation of the
phrase "civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction" in § 1367(a). The Court
conclude[d] the answer must be yes. When the well-pleaded complaint contains at least one claim that satisfies the amount-in-controversy requirement, and there are no other relevantjurisdictionaldefects,
the district court, beyond all question, has original jurisdiction over
that claim. The presence of other claims in the complaint, over which the
district court may lack originaljurisdiction,is of no moment. If the court

has original jurisdiction over a single claim in the complaint, it has
original jurisdiction over a 'civil action' within the meaning of
§ 1367(a), even if the civil action over which it has jurisdiction comprises

148
fewer claims than were included in the complaint.

Here the Supreme Court holds that if a single claim between one
plaintiff and one defendant in a complaint is jurisdictionally sufficient
in all respects (i.e., in the diversity context, there is complete diversity
between the parties to the claim, and the amount-in-controversy requirement is met), then the district court "beyond all question" has
original jurisdiction over that claim, regardless of "the presence of
(1989))). In some sense this can be considered a shift from the traditional practice of
construing statutory grants ofjurisdiction narrowly. See supranote 13 and accompanying text.
144 Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2620.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 See id.
148 Id. at 2620-21 (emphases added).
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other claims in the complaint." 49 The remarkable reach of this state50
ment will be seen below.'
Having stated its view that a single jurisdictionally sufficient claim
in a complaint is enough to satisfy the "original jurisdiction" requirement of § 1367(a), the Court then made the same observation about
§ 1367(b) that commentators had made soon after the statute was
passed: none of the specific circumstances described in § 1367(b) operates to withhold supplemental jurisdiction over claims by additional
plaintiffs added under Rules 20 or 23.151 "The natural, indeed the
necessary, inference is that § 1367 confers supplemental jurisdiction
'1 52
over claims by Rule 20 and Rule 23 plaintiffs.'
The majority recognized, but rejected, the alternative view of
§ 1367 "that a district court lacks original jurisdiction over a civil action unless the court has original jurisdiction over every claim in the
complaint." 53 The Court criticized this view because it requires one
or the other of two assumptions which it found equally untenable.
Either "all claims in the complaint must stand or fall as a single, indivisible 'civil action' as a matter of definitional necessity,"'154 or "the
inclusion of a claim or party falling outside the district court's original
jurisdiction somehow contaminates every other claim in the complaint, depriving the court of original jurisdiction over any of these

claims."

155

The Court rejected the "indivisibility" theory, noting that it is contradicted by the practice of dismissing individual claims or parties in
order to cure jurisdictional defects, rather than dismissing the entire
case. 1 56 The indivisibility theory would require a federal court to examine the entire complaint as a single unit, deeming itjurisdictionally
sufficient only if every claim meets the requirements; if even one
149 Id.; cf Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824)
(" [W] hen a question to which the judicial power of the Union is extended by the
constitution, forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is in the power of Congress
to give the Circuit Courts jurisdiction of that cause, although other questions of fact
or of law may be involved in it.").
150 See infra Part III.C.
151 Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2621.
152 Id. (emphasis added).
153 Id.; see Pfander, supra note 94, at 127-28.
154 Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2621.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 2622 (citing Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 590 (1939), for the
proposition that "claims that are jurisdictionally defective as to amount in controversy
do not destroy original jurisdiction over other claims").
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claim fails, then the indivisibility theory would mandate dismissal of
157
the entire case.
Significantly, the Court also rejected the reasoning of the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals that the language in § 1367(a) operates dif158
ferently in federal question cases than it does in diversity cases.
The Court considered it
implausible .

.

. to say that the identical phrase means one thing

(original jurisdiction in all actions where at least one claim in the
complaint meets the following requirements) in § 1331 and something else (original jurisdiction in all actions where every claim in
the complaint meets the following requirements) in § 1332.159
Thus, up to this point in its analysis, the Court has endorsed a
very broad and expansive reading of § 1367 that, indeed, codifies
Gibbs to the extent its language contemplated: Given the presence of a
federal claim, federal courts have power to hear all other related
claims so long as they are part of the same Article III case or controversy. Subject to the specific list of exceptions in § 1367(b), federal
courts are able to hear virtually any claim that shares a "common nucleus of operative fact"'160 with a valid federal claim.
The Court then attempted to cut back on the breadth of this interpretation in its discussion of the "contamination" theory-the idea
that the presence of a jurisdictionally insufficient claim contaminates
every other claim in the action, destroying the original jurisdiction
that might otherwise have been invoked. 16 1 Specifically, the Court accepted the contamination theory as applied to the diversity of citizenship requirement, while rejecting it as applied to the amount-incontroversy requirement.

62

"The contamination theory ... can make

some sense in the special context of the complete diversity requirement .... The theory, however, makes little sense with respect to the
amount-in-controversy requirement .... -163 Thus, the Court rejected
the contamination theory in all respects except for the purpose of requiring complete diversity among all parties, lest " [i] ncomplete diver164
sity destroy[] original jurisdiction with respect to all claims."
Stating that "[t]here is no inherent logical connection between the
amount-in-controversy requirement and § 1332 diversity jurisdiction,"
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164

Id.
Id.; see Leonhardt v. W. Sugar Co., 160 F.3d 631, 640-41 (10th Cir. 1998).
Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2622.
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2622.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2618.
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the Court asserted that it is "fallacious to suppose, simply from the
proposition that § 1332 imposes both the diversity requirement and
the amount-in-controversy requirement, that the contamination theory germane to the former is also relevant to the latter."1 65 With this
distinction, the Court went on to hold expressly that § 1367(a) overruled Clark, and by implication, Zahn as well.1 6 6
Following the consideration of some other arguments not directly
relevant to the scope of this Note, 16 7 the Court "circle [d] back to the
original question." 168 On one hand, the Court proclaimed that
"[u]nder § 1367, the court has original jurisdiction over the civil action comprising the claims for which there is no jurisdictional defect," 169 thus providing something to which supplemental jurisdiction
can attach. On the other hand, "the special nature and purpose of
the diversity requirement mean that a single nondiverse party can
contaminate every other claim in the lawsuit,"1 70 thus depriving otherwise valid claims of original jurisdiction; but contamination "does not
occur with respect to jurisdictional defects that go only to the substantive importance of individual claims." 17 1 As a result, the Court concluded that § 1367 overruled Zahn and Clark, but seemed never to
consider seriously the possibility that § 1367 also overruled
172

Strawbridge.

165 Id. at 2622.
166 Id. ("[Section] 1367(a) unambiguously overrules the holding and result in
Clark. If that is so, however, it would be quite extraordinary to say that § 1367 did not
also overrule Zahn, a case that was premised in substantial part on the holding in
Clark."); see also id. at 2625 ("We hold that § 1367 by its plain text overruled Zahn and
Clark and authorized supplemental jurisdiction over all claims by diverse parties arising out of the same Article III case or controversy .... .").
167 See id. at 2622-23 (comparing the present question to the "closely analogous
context of removal jurisdiction"); id. at 2623-24 (rejecting the argument that "while
the presence of additional claims over which the district lacks jurisdiction" is within
the reach of § 1367(a), "the presence of additional parties" is not); id. at 2624 (acknowledging that the Court's holding "creates an anomaly" by permitting permissive
plaintiffs under Rule 20 to acquire supplemental jurisdiction, while prohibiting its use
by indispensable plaintiffs under Rule 19 or plaintiff intervenors under Rule 24, but
dismissing it as "no more anomalous than ... if the alternative view of § 1367(a) were
to prevail").
168 Id. at 2624.
169 Id. at 2625.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 See infra Part III.C.
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The Administration of Justice(?): Legislative History and
CongressionalIntent

The Allapattah Court found the legislative history rationale 1 73 unpersuasive, rejecting arguments that rely on the legislative history "at
the very outset simply because § 1367 is not ambiguous.' 1 74 While
most commentators concede that a literal reading of the statute would
indeed overrule Zahn and Clark,1 75 the "uncommonly clear legislative
history"' 7 6 of § 1367 strongly suggests that the plain text should yield
to the statement of congressional intent. But, as the Allapattah Court
claims to "have repeatedly held, the authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the legislative history or any other extrinsic material.
Extrinsic materials have a role in statutory interpretation only to the
extent they shed a reliable light on the enacting Legislature's understanding of otherwise ambiguous terms."'1 77 Thus, under the majority's view there is no ambiguity and hence no occasion to refer to the
1 78
legislative history.
The majority could have stopped there, but decided to go on and
declare that "[e]ven if... the reading these proponents urge upon us
is textually plausible, the legislative history cited to support it would
not alter our view as to the best interpretation of § 1367."179 The
Court found the particular legislative history relevant to this case wanting for two reasons. First, it was "far murkier than selective quotation
from the House Report would suggest," 8 0 and therefore was inconclu173 See supra notes 106-21 and accompanying text.
174 Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2625. But see The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-Leading
Cases, 119 HARv. L. REV. 169, 325 (2005) (arguing that the majority's determination of
unambiguity "conflicts with the common understanding of 'ambiguous'" and was influenced by "skepticism of § 1367's legislative history," thereby "turn [ing] the prevailing framework for the use of legislative history on its head").
175 See, e.g., Rowe et al., Reply, supranote 104, at 960 n.90; see also Freer, supra note
34, at 18 ("All observers agree that the supplemental-jurisdiction statute, on its face,
overrules Zahn.").
176 Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2631 (StevensJ., dissenting).
177 Id. at 2626 (majority opinion).
178 But see id. at 2628 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (" [T] he Court has made the remarkable declaration that its reading of the statute is so obviously correct-and Justice
GINSBURG's so obviously wrong-that the text does not even qualify as 'ambiguous.' . . . I remain convinced that it is unwise to treat the ambiguity vel non of a statute
as determinative of whether legislative history is consulted."); The Supreme Court, 2004
Term-Leading Cases, supra note 174, at 323 & n.45.
179 Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2625 (majority opinion).
180 Id. at 2626.
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sive when taken as a whole.18 1 Second, "the worst fears of critics who
argue legislative history will be used to circumvent the Article I process were realized in this case."' 18 2 The majority found it exceedingly
persuasive that "parties who have detailed, specific knowledge of the
statute and the drafting process [acknowledged] both that the plain
text of § 1367 overruled Zahn and that language to the contrary in the
183
House Report was a post hoc attempt to alter that result.
Finally, in a short postscript, the majority briefly considered the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005,184 only to conclude that it "has no
bearing on our analysis of these cases .... It abrogates the rule against
aggregating claims .... [but] is not retroactive, and the views of the
2005 Congress are not relevant to our interpretation of a text enacted
by Congress in 1990.185 The Court also pointed out that the issues
raised by these cases would continue to arise in cases outside CAFA's
187
purview, 18 6 so a decision on the question was still necessary.
According to the Supreme Court majority in Allapattah, then,
here is how matters stand: First, the plain text of § 1367 is clear and
unambiguous, overrules the holdings of Zahn and Clark, and thus permits supplemental jurisdiction over claims that do not meet the
amount-in-controversy requirement as long as at least one claim is jurisdictionally sufficient. Second, despite some indication in the legislative history that this was not an intended result, the plain text of the
statute controls. But, third, when it comes to the Strawbridge rule of
complete diversity, none of the foregoing applies. The plain text of
§ 1367 does not clearly and unambiguously overrule Strawbridge, and
181 But see id. at 2630 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("That a subcommittee of the Federal Courts Study Committee believed that an earlier, substantially similar version of
the statute overruled Zahn only highlights the fact that the statute is ambiguous."
(citation omitted)); Steinman, supra note 130, at 316 ("Justice Kennedy relied on a
non-congressional subcommittee report that the House Judiciary Committee never
mentioned and whose recommendations were directly contrary to the goals expressed
in the House report.").
182 Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2627 (majority opinion). The Court was referring to
the statement by Professors Rowe, Burbank, and Mengler that the legislative history
regarding Zahn "was an attempt to correct the oversight" in the actual language of the
statute. See id. (quoting Rowe et al., Reply, supra note 104, at 960 n.90); cf.John F.
Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. Rv. 673, 675 (1997)

(arguing against legislative history because of its potential for bypassing the Article I
requirements of bicameralism and presentment).
183 Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2627.
184 Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 4(a), 119 Stat. 4, 9-12 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d),
1453, 1711-1715); see supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
185 Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2627-28.
186 Id. at 2628.
187

See id.
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for complete diversity, the intent of Congress is taken into accounteven though, according to the majority's analysis in the Zahn/Clark
context, "the authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the legislative history or any other extrinsic material."188
C.

Stopping So Far Short: How the Supreme Court Attempts To Shield
Strawbridge from Allapattah 's Reach (But Fails)

As discussed, the Allapattah Court made extremely broad statements about the meaning and reach of § 1367 in its holding, but tried
diligently to cut back on the impact of those statements in the context
of the requirement of diversity of citizenship. 189 The Court held that
a "civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction"
can consist of a single claim in a complaint, regardless of the jurisdictional sufficiency of other claims in the complaint, 190 but claimed in
dicta that the "special nature and purpose" of the complete diversity
requirement nevertheless permits claims by nondiverse parties to destroy original jurisdiction, even when there is a claim in the action
that would invoke original jurisdiction on its own. 191
To justify this disparate treatment, Justice Kennedy's majority
opinion invoked the purported purposes of the two requirements of
diversity jurisdiction. 192 The majority wrote that the presence of a
nondiverse party does indeed contaminate the entire action because
"the presence of nondiverse parties on both sides of a lawsuit eliminates the justification for providing a federal forum," whereas the addition of a claim of insufficient amount to a claim of sufficient amount
"does nothing to reduce the importance of the claims that do meet
188 Id. at 2626 (emphasis added). Presumably the declaration that "[i]n diversity
cases, the district courts may exercise supplemental jurisdiction, except when doing
so would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of the diversity statute,"
H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 28 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6874, is
nonauthoritative "other extrinsic material" to the same extent that "[t]he section is
not intended to affect the jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 in diversityonly class actions, as those requirements were interpreted prior to Finley" is. Id., as
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6875; see infra notes 207-212 and accompanying
text.
189 See supra Part III.A.

190 See Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2620-21.
191 See id. at 2625.
192 See id. at 2618 ("[T]he purpose of the diversity requirement... is to provide a
federal forum for important disputes where state courts might favor, or be perceived
as favoring, home-state litigants."); id. at 2622 (" [T] he amount-in-controversy requirement..., is meant to ensure that a dispute is sufficiently important to warrant federalcourt attention."); infra Part W.A.

2oo6]

SERIOUS

MISCHIEFS

2043

[the] requirement.' 19 3 In other words, once there is a single claim
that satisfies the minimum amount in controversy, nothing about the
addition of subsequent claims for lesser amounts diminishes the total
magnitude of the controversy as a whole. But, according to the Court,
the presence of nondiverse parties on both sides of the case does fundamentally negate the purpose for which diversity jurisdiction exists;
thus, it is appropriate to maintain a "contamination theory" approach
to diversity of citizenship.
The problem with this distinction is that it is utterly irreconcilable
with the holding and rationale of Allapattah.1 9 4 There are four reasons why the majority's attempt to shield Strawbridgefrom its own analysis fails.
First, the Court's analysis of the text of § 1367 admits of no opportunity to shelter Strawbridge from the statute's reach. The majority
held that a single valid federal claim is sufficient to confer original
jurisdiction, that § 1367(a) then acts by its plain terms to permit supplemental jurisdiction over all related claims, subject to specific exceptions in § 1367(b), and that nothing in § 1367(b) exempts Rule 20 coplaintiffs. 19 5 This is precisely the rationale used by the Court to determine that § 1367 overruled Zahn and Clark. The Court noted that
"[s]ection 1367(b) ... applies only to diversity cases [and] withholds
supplemental jurisdiction" over particular plaintiffs, but not over
plaintiffs "permissively joined under Rule 20 . . . or certified as classaction members pursuant to Rule 23."196 Crucially, the Court's analysis of the effect and meaning of § 1367(a) and (b) never mentions,
much less depends on, the citizenship of the parties. The majority's
consideration of "the special nature and purpose" of complete diversity comes later in the opinion, as an attempt to contain the scope of
the statutory analysis. 197 Purely in terms of the statute's text, however,
there is no support for a limitation on, or an exception to, the supplemental jurisdiction granted by § 1367(a) in the diversity (i.e., § 1332)
context, other than the specific instances described in § 1367(b). Nor
193 Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2622.
194 Cf id. at 2635 n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Endeavoring to preserve the
'complete diversity rule' . . . , the Court's opinion drives a wedge between the two
components of 28 U.S.C. § 1332, treating the diversity-of-citizenship requirement as
essential, the amount-in-controversy requirement as more readily disposable. ...
[T]he Court asserts that amount in controversy can be analyzed claim-by-claim, but
the diversity requirement cannot. It is not altogether clear why that should be so."
(citations omitted)).
195 See id. at 2619-21 (majority opinion).
196

Id. at 2621.

197

Id. at 2625.

2044

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 81:5

is there any basis in the language of § 1367(b) to support a refusal to
grant supplemental jurisdiction over claims by nondiverse Rule 20
and Rule 23 plaintiffs. Thus, if § 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction for claims by Rule 20 and Rule 23 plaintiffs that do not meet the
amount in controversy, as the Allapattah Court held, then it must also
permit supplemental jurisdiction for claims by Rule 20 and Rule 23
plaintiffs that do not satisfy complete diversity. 198
Second, the Court dismissed claims that the "identical phrase
means one thing ... in § 1331 and something else ... in § 1332,"'19 9
but in order to preserve Strawbridge, the Court essentially stated that
the identical phrase means one thing in § 1332 and something else in
the very same § 1332. The Court rejected the "indivisibility theory"
supporting the "sympathetic textualist" reading of § 1367 because it
would require courts to treat federal question cases differently from
diversity cases. 20 0 For federal question cases, the sympathetic textualist view permits courts to look at each claim individually to determine
whether § 1331 jurisdiction is proper, and then use § 1367 to hear any
related but jurisdictionally insufficient claims. But for diversity cases,
the sympathetic textualist view requires courts to consider the entire
civil action as a whole, and to determine that original jurisdiction is
lacking if any one claim in the complaint fails to satisfy the complete
diversity or minimum amount requirements. The Court found this
theory at odds both with the actual practice of curing jurisdictional
defects by dismissing insufficient claims or parties, and with the very
notion of supplemental jurisdiction as extending to claims that by definition do not meet the requirements for original jurisdiction. 20 1
Similarly, in its discussion of the "contamination" theory, the
Court rejected the notion that a single claim below the requisite
amount in controversy defeats jurisdiction over the entire action, instead maintaining that each claim could and should be evaluated on
its own. 202 Yet the Court endorsed the idea of considering the civil
198 Cf Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mech., Inc., 77 F.3d
1996) ("If § 1367(a) allows suit by a pendent plaintiff who meets
amount but not the diversity requirement, it also allows suit by a
who satisfies the diversity requirement but not the jurisdictional

928, 931 (7th Cir.
the jurisdictional
pendent plaintiff
amount." (citing

Brazinski v. Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 6 F.3d 1176 (7th Cir. 1993))).

199 Allapattah, 125 S.Ct. at 2622; cf Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 829-30 (2002) (determining that the meaning of "arising
under" is the same in both 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), thus requiring
application of the same doctrinal tests to both provisions).
200 See supra notes 153-59 and accompanying text.
201 See Allapattah, 125 S.Ct. at 2621-22.
202 See id. at 2622; see also supra note 194.
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action as a whole for the purpose of determining complete diversity. 203
In other words, the very same flaw that invalidated the indivisibility

theory-its disparate treatment of complaints-was endorsed by the
Court as a proper application of the contamination theory. The
Court rejected the indivisibility theory because it would require the
same phrase in two different statutes to mean two different things, but
incredibly, the Allapattah majority's position on the contamination
theory would require the same phrase in the very same statute to mean
two different things. 20 4 The Court treated the two requirements of
diversity jurisdiction as fundamentally distinct and subject to completely different rules. 20 5 But if "original jurisdiction of all civil actions" means the same thing in § 1331 and § 1332,206 then surely the
meaning of that phrase cannot change within § 1332, depending on
whether the diversity of citizenship requirement or the amount-incontroversy requirement is being considered.
Third, the Court held that the text of § 1367 is unambiguous, and
there is thus no need to consult any extrinsic material to inform the
statute's meaning; 20 7 but the unambiguous text of the statute operates
to overturn Strawbridge as surely as it does Zahn and Clark. If the majority meant what it said, 20 8 and if indeed it found § 1367 to be unambiguous, 20 9 then the only thing that matters is the text of the statute.
And the text of the statute concededly permits nondiverse plaintiffs to
203 See Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2622.
204 See Steinman, supra note 130, at 314 ("Justice Kennedy, despite his avowed
fidelity to the text ..... defined [the] same phrase to mean different things in the
same statute: the presence of a non-diverse plaintiff defeats original jurisdiction for all
plaintiffs, but the presence of a plaintiff without the requisite amount in controversy
does not.").
205 The Court explained that "[t]here is no inherent logical connection between
the amount-in-controversy requirement and § 1332 diversity jurisdiction" and that
there is no reason to suppose that "the contamination theory germane to the [diversity requirement] is also relevant to [amount in controversy]." Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at
2622. The Court failed to consider that there is also no reason to suppose that the
contamination theory continues to be germane to the diversity requirement after the
passage of § 1367. See Freer, supra note 34, at 18 (noting that a literal reading of
§ 1367 would overrule the complete diversity requirement); Rowe et al., Reply, supra
note 104, at 960 n.90 (acknowledging same).
206 See Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2622.
207 Id. at 2625-26.
208 Id. at 2626 ("As we have repeatedly held, the authoritative statement is the
statutory text, not the legislative history or any other extrinsic material. Extrinsic
materials have a role in statutory interpretation only to the extent they shed a reliable
light on the enacting Legislature's understanding of otherwise ambiguous terms.");
see supra Part III.B.
209 Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2625 ("[Section] 1367 is not ambiguous.").
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assert claims related to the claims of a diverse plaintiff.2 10 Nothing in

the unambiguous text of § 1367 provides a confirmation of the "special nature and purpose" of the complete diversity rule. Even the text
of § 1367(b), which applies only in diversity cases and withdraws supplemental jurisdiction "when exercising [it] would be inconsistent
with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332,"211 operates only
in certain specified instances, none of which would cover the joinder
of a permissive Rule 20 co-plaintiff. The only other way to read the
complete diversity rule into the text of § 1367 is to adopt the sympathetic textualist view, bringing it in through the "civil action of which
the district courts have original jurisdiction" language of § 1367(a).
But the Court rejected this view of § 1367(a), holding instead that a
single claim is sufficient to establish original jurisdiction. 2 12 Thus,
there is no way to incorporate the complete diversity rule into the text
of § 1367; and because that text is clear and unambiguous, there is no
need, and indeed, no justification, to look beyond the text itself.
Therefore, § 1367 must override Strawbridgejust as it overrides Zahn
and Clark.
Finally, the Court refused to yield to legislative history in holding
that § 1367 overruled Zahn, but acquiesced to congressional intent by
treating Strawbridge differently. 2 13 The Court underscored the claim
from Finley that "'[w] hatever we [the Court] say regarding the scope
of jurisdiction conferred by a particular statute can of course be
changed by Congress,'

'' 214

and emphasized that there is "no war-

rant... for assuming that § 1367 did no more than to overrule Finley." 215 Given the interpretation the Court then gave to § 1367, there
is also no warrant for assuming that § 1367 went beyond overruling
Finley, but did not go so far as to overrule Strawbridge. The Court
"treat[ed] statutory interpretation as a pedantic exercise, divorced
from any serious attempt at ascertaining congressional intent,"216 be-

cause it found the text clear and unambiguous. The Court was thus
unmoved by the "virtual billboard of congressional intent"217 found in
the legislative history, where the intent was claimed to be the reversal
210 See supra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
211 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (2000).
212 Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2620-21.
213 Id. at 2617-18 (discussing the Court's "adhere[nce] to the complete diversity
rule in light of the purpose of the diversity requirement").
214 Id. at 2619 (quoting Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989)) (first
alteration in original).
215 Id. at 2620.
216 Id. at 2629 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
217 Id. at 2630.
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of Finley and very little more.2 1 8 Indeed, the Court held that the unambiguous text of § 1367 overruled the Zahn rule for class actions, 2 19
despite the express statement to the contrary in the legislative
history.

2 20

But if the unambiguity of the statutory text is so strong that it
compels an interpretation contrary to the stated intent of Congress
with respect to the rule in Zahn, then that same unambiguous text
must be strong enough to compel the same interpretation with respect to the analogous rule in Strawbridge. Any declaration, implication or hint in the legislative history of § 1367 purporting to evince a
congressional intent to preserve the complete diversity rule 22 1 is no
more relevant or controlling than is the unmistakable statement of
intent to preserve Zahn. The Court ignored the billboard and found
that § 1367 overturned Zahn; logically, the Strawbridgeparallel cannot
be distinguished.

22 2

Section 1367 thus undermines both rules with the same text, and
the interpretive rules employed by the Court leave no room to consider congressional intent for any purpose-even Strawbridge. The "internal inconsistencies [and] contradictory messages" 22 3 stemming
from Allapattah's refusal to apply its own rules have left the supplemental jurisdiction situation in as much confusion as it was ever in,
and have also obscured the "background of clear interpretive rules"
against which Congress is expected to legislate on jurisdictional issues. 22 4 Whereas the Finley Court committed to Congress that it

would be transparent and consistent in its interpretation of statutory
grants of judicial power, 225 the Allapattah Court retreated from that
promise, saying instead that only" [o] rdinary principles of statutory
22 6
construction apply."

218 See supra notes 109-21 and accompanying text.
219 Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2625.
220 H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 29 & n.17 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6860, 6875.
221 See id. at 28-29, as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6874-75; supra text accompanying note 120.
222 To be clear, this Note does not take the position that Strawbridge ought to be
overturned, but rather that the rationale used by the Court in Allapattah to overturn
Zahn and Clark applies with equal force to Strawbridge.

223
224

Steinman, supra note 130, at 335.
See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989); infra Part V.C.

225

See Finley, 490 U.S. at 556.

226

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2620 (2005).
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227

IN ALLAPATTAH

What ought to be the fate of Strawbridge in light of the Supreme
Court's ruling in Allapattah? If, as a majority of the Court clearly believes, a statute's text controls whenever it is plain and unambiguous,

228
regardless of any precedent or legislative history to the contrary,
then Strawbridge is no more sacred than Zahn, and it must fall. But the
Court already indicated, in Allapattah itself, that it is unwilling to endorse this inevitable conclusion of its interpretation of § 1367.229
Thus, it is very possible that lower courts may be even more confused
as a result of this ruling. While there is now a clear answer on the
question of whether § 1367 overrules Zahn and Clark, new questions
regarding the extent to which courts should literally apply the statute
have arisen in its place. 230 In its effort to preserve the complete diversity rule, the Court has compromised the "background of clear interpretive rules" against which Congress is expected to legislate on

jurisdictional issues, reopening the earlier debate over whether and
how far federal courts are authorized to act.2 31 This Part considers

the Strawbridge rule in the context of diversity jurisdiction's history
and utility, offers several possible reconciliations of the current jurisdictional contradiction represented by Allapattah, and concludes that
whatever reconciliation is chosen, the onus is on Congress to provide
a "background of clear statutory rules" for the Court to interpret.
A.

Somewhat Singular: The (In)effectiveness of the
Complete Diversity Rule

Why was the Supreme Court so much more concerned about preserving Strawbridgethan it was about preserving Zahn and Clark? One
obvious possible answer is the relative age of the rules. Complete diversity had its origin in the Marshall Court, whereas Clark was an early
227 Rowe et al., Reply, supra note 104, at 961 n.91.
228 Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2625-27.
229 Id. at 2625 ("Though the special nature and purpose of the diversity requirement mean that a single nondiverse party can contaminate every other claim in the
lawsuit, the contamination does not occur with respect to jurisdictional defects that

go only to the substantive importance of individual claims.").
230 See Steinman, supra note 130, at 335 ("Allapattah fails to provide coherent guidance for interpreting... troublesome jurisdictional statutes. Because of its internal
inconsistencies, Allapattah sends contradictory messages to federal courts."). But see
infra note 253 (summarizing post-Allapattah decisions and finding little confusion so
far, particularly on Allapattah's lesson for statutory interpretation).
231 See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989); supra text accompanying

notes 223-26.
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twentieth-century holding and Zahn dated from the mid-1970s. But
the Allapattah majority never expressly invoked the age of the complete diversity rule; it said simply that "we have consistently inter23 2
preted § 1332 as requiring complete diversity."
Instead, the Court repeatedly emphasized the "special nature and
purpose" of the complete diversity rule: "l[T] o provide a federal forum
for important disputes where state courts might favor, or be perceived
as favoring, home-state litigants. The presence of parties from the
same State on both sides of a case dispels this concern, eliminating a
principal reason for" diversity jurisdiction. 23 3 But as Professor Redish
explains, it is not at all clear that the complete diversity rule successfully eliminates the problem of state court bias against out-of-state litigants. 23 4 Suppose several plaintiffs from Massachusetts sue several
235
defendants from Massachusetts and one defendant from Vermont.
According to the traditional understanding of the complete diversity
rule, this case would lack original jurisdiction because there are Massachusetts parties on both sides of the case; thus, the state court would
not favor one side or the other, and there is no reason to worry about
bias against the out-of-state parties. If the plaintiffs brought the case
in federal court, it would be dismissed; if the plaintiffs brought the
case in state court, the defendants could not remove it to federal
court.
Suppose, then, that the Massachusetts plaintiffs bring the case in
Massachusetts state court. The complete diversity rule would assume
that there is no bias problem because there are Massachusetts parties
on both sides. But, if the state court is intent on favoring the home
parties, it could very easily favor all Massachusetts parties at the expense of the Vermont party. On the other hand, if the case were
brought in Vermont, the state could very easily favor the Vermont defendant over the other defendants from Massachusetts. Thus, the lack
of complete diversity is not a guaranteed solution to the problem of
232 Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2617 (citing Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch)
267 (1806); Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978)).
233 Id. at 2618. But see Friendly, supra note 17, at 495-97 (discounting the homestate bias explanation for diversity jurisdiction and arguing that the true reason for its
existence was to encourage expansion of commercial interests by providing a forum
more friendly to creditors than state courts, which were perceived as generally prodebtor).
234 See Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation ofJudicial Business Between State
and FederalCourts: FederalJurisdictionand "The Martian Chronicles," 78 VA. L. REV. 1769,

1805 (1992) (describing a hypothetical to demonstrate the possibility of bias in an
incomplete diversity case).
235 This is the posture of Strawbridge, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267.
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state court bias; the "special nature and purpose" of the rule is per236
haps not so special after all.

B.

The ConstitutionalExtent: Fine Tuning the
Scope of Diversity Jurisdiction

Regardless of what one thinks of the effectiveness of the complete
diversity rule, there can be little doubt that the very existence of diversity jurisdiction has always been controversial. 23 7 In the debates over
ratification of the Constitution, 238 and again in the debate over the
judiciary in the First Congress, 239 Antifederalists opposed the grant of
diversity jurisdiction (and often the creation of inferior federal courts
themselves) out of fear that it would "swallow up" state jurisdiction
and essentially drive state courts to extinction. In the early twentieth
century, such leading figures as Roscoe Pound, Felix Frankfurter, and
Henry Friendly argued that diversity jurisdiction should be eliminated
236 See FALLON ET AL., supra note 1, at 141 (Supp. 2005) ("[W] ill the presence of
citizens of the same state-even the forum state-on both sides of a case guarantee
that a party from another state will not be disfavored in the consideration of questions
of liability and/or the measure of relief? Wouldn't it often be possible to prefer a
forum-state defendant at the expense of an out-of-state defendant?").

237

See, e.g.,

HENRVJ. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION

149-50 (1973); Frank M.

Coffin, Judicial Gridlock: The Case for Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction, BROOKINGS REV.,
Winter 1992, at 34, 34-39; Larry Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction, 1990 BYU L. REV. 97,
121-23; Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction:Positive Side Effects and
Potentialfor FurtherReforms, 92 HARv. L. REv. 963, 964 (1979).
238

See, e.g., 3

THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION

526 (Jonathan Elliot ed. 1836) (statement of George
Mason), available at http://rs6.loc.gov/ll/led/003/0500/05380526.tif. ("Their jurisdiction further extends to controversies between citizens of different states. Can we
not trust our state courts with the decision of these? If I have a controversy with a
man in Maryland,... are not the state courts competent to try it? Is it suspected that
they would enforce the payment if unjust, or refuse to enforce it ifjust? The very idea
is ridiculous. What! carry me a thousand miles from home-from my family and business-to where, perhaps, it will be impossible for me to prove that I paid it? Perhaps I
have a respectable witness who saw me pay the money; but I must carry him one
thousand miles to prove it, or be compelled to pay it again. Is there any necessity for
this power? It ought to have no unnecessary or dangerous power. Why should the
federal courts have this cognizance? Is it because one lives on one side of the Potomac, and the other on the other?").
239 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 813 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (recording a proposal in the
First Congress to eliminate all inferior court jurisdiction except in admiralty cases,
and a speech by Representative Livermore expressing fear that thejudiciary bill would
establish "an entire new system ofjurisprudence, and fill every State in the Union with
two kinds of courts for the trial of many causes.... [I] t will be establishing a Government within a Government, and one must prevail upon the ruin of the other.").
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
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or seriously curtailed, as a waste of judicial resources. 240 Members of
Congress introduced legislation to abolish or restrict diversity jurisdiction, 24 1 but the only congressional restriction on diversity jurisdiction
has been to increase the minimum amount in controversy. 242 Notably, the Federal Courts Study Committee, whose supplemental jurisdiction recommendation became § 1367, also recommended in its
April 1990 report that Congress consider abolishing almost all diversity jurisdiction.

243

Nevertheless, diversity jurisdiction has survived. With it, the complete diversity rule thrived for more than 160 years with only one significant exception 244 until the Supreme Court's decision in State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire,24 5 upholding federal interpleader jurisdiction based on minimal diversity and declaring the complete diversity rule to be one of statutory interpretation rather than
constitutional mandate. 246 Once it became clear that Congress could
indeed modify or limit the Strawbridge rule, it did so on at least two
more occasions. Congress passed the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002247 to provide for federal jurisdiction over cases
involving multiple claims arising from the same transaction, conduct,
or accident, provided minimal diversity exists and certain requirements are met. Similarly, the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005248 also
predicates federal jurisdiction on minimal diversity for class actions
240 See Friendly, supra note 17, at 510 (calling for a critical reexamination of the
bases of diversity jurisdiction); Stanley Sporkin, Reforming the FederalJudiciay,46 SMU
L. REv. 751, 756 n.26 (citing Robert K. Kastenmeier & Michael J. Remington, Court
Reform and Access to Justice: A Legislative Perspective, 16 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 301 (1979))
(naming Roscoe Pound, Felix Frankfurter, and Robert Bork as critics of diversity
jurisdiction).
241

See, e.g., Robert C. Brown, The Jurisdictionof the FederalCourts Based on Diversity of

Citizenship, 78 U. PA. L. REv. 179 (1929) (discussing a bill in the 70th Congress to
abolish diversity jurisdiction); see also Note, A Closer Look at Pendent and AncillaryJurisdiction: Toward a Theory of Incidental Jurisdiction, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1935, 1943 n.52

(1982) (describing other legislative attempts to abolish diversity jurisdiction).
242 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
243 FCSC REPORT, supra note 90, at 38-42.
244 Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 366-67 (1921) (permitting
nondiverse members of a class action so long as complete diversity exists between the
named class representatives and the opposing parties).
245 386 U.S. 523 (1967).
246

Id. at 530-31; see supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.

247

Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 11020, 116 Stat. 1758, 1826 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A.

§ 1369 (West Supp. 2006)); see also C. Douglas Floyd, The Limits of MinimalDiversity,55

L.J. 613, 613 (2004).
248 Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 4(a), 119 Stat. 4, 9-12 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d),
1453, 1711-1715); see supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
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that meet certain requirements designed to ensure they are truly of a

249
national or multistate nature.

Notably, the 1917 Federal Interpleader Act and the 2002 Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act, along with currently existing alienage jurisdiction, correspond to the three areas in which the
1990 Federal Courts Study Committee recommended that diversity jurisdiction be retained. 250 CAFA goes a step further than the Committee had recommended, but the rationale for hearing multistate class
actions in federal court aligns with the rationale for retaining jurisdiction over complex multistate litigation. Thus, Congress has already
specifically provided statutory frameworks for the areas of diversity jurisdiction recommended for retention by the Federal Courts Study
Committee; for interpleader cases, multistate class actions, and complex multistate litigation, minimal diversity rather than complete diversity is the rule. 25 1 Against this background, it is even less certain

whether Congress continues to intend that § 1367 should be so lim2 52
ited in the diversity context.

249 But see Steinman, supra note 130, at 319-27 (arguing that strict adherence to
the explicit Allapattah rationale would also compel an extremely broad interpretation
of CAFA that would permit virtually any class action to be removed to federal court,
even if it is local in character).
250 FCSC REPORT, supra note 90, at 38.
251 One might interpret these statutes, particularly the two more recent ones, as
evidence of a growing congressional warmth or acceptance of diversity jurisdiction.
In both instances, the legislation arose in order to expand diversity jurisdiction into
areas previously thought to be inaccessible under the diversity doctrines discussed
above. See supra Part I.A. True, the fact that Congress believed such legislation was
necessary suggests that it did not believe § 1367 standing alone provided the requisite
statutory grant of jurisdiction. But under the Supreme Court's Allapattah rationaleif not artificially limited, as the Court attempted-it does not matter what Congress
thought, in 1990 or 2002 or 2005, so long as the text of the statute is clear and unambiguous, as the Court held § 1367 to be. In any event, the passage of both CAFA and
the Multiforum, Multiparty Trial Jurisdiction Act support the inference that modern
Congresses are less hostile to diversity jurisdiction than earlier Congresses may have
been.
252 While the Court correctly noted that "the views of the 2005 Congress are not
relevant to our interpretation of a text enacted by Congress in 1990," Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2628 (2005), the dynamic theory of
statutory interpretation would urge the Court to "reference signals being sent by the
current Congress as well as the broader social and legal context when addressing
questions of statutory construction," Amanda L. Tyler, Continuity, Coherence, and the
Canons, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1389, 1390 (2005); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 390 (1991)
("Where they diverge from the Courts' preferences, the expectations of the current
Congress and the President are more important to the Court than are the expectations of the enacting Congress.").
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Mandatory to the Legislature: Congress Must Provide a Background of
Clear Statutory Rules for the Courts To Interpret

If the current state of things remains unchanged, lower courts
would seem to have two alternatives. They can follow the illogical and
self-contradictory reasoning of Allapattah and apply a plain text reading of § 1367 except when doing so threatens the complete diversity
rule. Or they can follow only the explicit holding of Allapattah with
respect to the amount-in-controversy requirement, and then determine on their own how to apply Allapattah in the diversity of citizenship context. 253 The dicta in Allapattah seems clear enough with
respect to the Supreme Court's view of the complete diversity rule.
Thus, most inferior courts are likely to follow it, and/or their previous
sympathetic readings of § 1367, to hold that Strawbridgeis not affected,
despite the inconsistency between that position and the holding that
§ 1367 overrules Zahn and Clark. But it is not impossible to suppose
that a circuit court of appeals might strictly apply the logic of Allapat254
tah's holding to the conclusion that § 1367 overrules Strawbridge.
While the existence of a maverick circuit would not rise to the level of
the unstable circuit split over the Zahn and Clark question, it would
nevertheless point out the inconsistency in Allapattah that undermines
the clarity promised in Finley. To rectify this problem, the Court
would either have to extend Allapattah to permit nondiverse joinder,
thereby admitting its error in reasoning, or else it would have to en253 According to the "Citing References" listed on Westlaw, Allapattah had been
cited by 162 decisions between June 23, 2005, when it was announced, and August 1,
2006. A review of these cases reveals that Allapattah has been cited roughly forty-nine
times for its principal holding permitting supplemental jurisdiction over diversity
claims of insufficient amount in controversy. See, e.g., Deajess Med. Imaging, P.C. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 381 F. Supp. 2d 307, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). In ten unreported decisions, district courts have cited Allapattah as a straightforward reaffirmation of the
complete diversity rule. See, e.g.,
Brown v. Kerkhoff, No. 4:05 CV 00274JEG, 2005 WL
2671529, at *5 (S.D. Iowa Oct. 19, 2005). More recently, the Ninth Circuit has done
so as well. See Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2006).
Interestingly, Allapattah's true impact may be felt more broadly than simply in jurisdictional cases: it has been cited approximately forty-eight times for its insistence that
legislative history cannot be consulted if the text of a statute is unambiguous. See, e.g.,
Murray v. Household Bank (SB), N.A., 386 F. Supp. 2d 993, 998-99 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
254 While no federal district or circuit court has yet read § 1367 after Allapattah to
permit supplemental jurisdiction over nondiverse co-plaintiffs, one federal magistrate
judge has done so. See Best Dev. & Constr. Corp. v. AmSouth Bank, No. 3:05 CV 251,
2005 WL 2249868, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 15, 2005) ("Because the Bests have been
permissively joined in this action, the Court may properly exercise supplemental jurisdiction over their claims pursuant to § 1367, without destroying the diversity that existed at the time of the removal of this action."), dismissed on other grounds, 2005 WL
3216264 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 29, 2005).

2054

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81:5

dorse unequivocally the complete diversity rule, thereby reopening
the divergence in jurisdiction jurisprudence that Finley attempted to
close when it invited Congress to provide a statutory basis for supplemental jurisdiction.
Alternatively, Congress can-and should-solve the problem by
amending or replacing § 1367 and other statutes to make them more
workable, less enigmatic,2 55 and more directly representative of the
actual intent of Congress. A number of legislative corrections exist,
from the very minor to the fundamentally sweeping, any one of which
would be an improvement over the current post-Allapattah
inconsistency.
If Congress chooses to limit the reach of Allapattah, the simplest
fix to § 1367 would be to amend subsection (b) so that supplemental
jurisdiction does not extend to the claims of plaintiffs "proposed to be
joined . . . or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs" under Rule 20.256 In
addition to being simple, this solution would leave the class action
holding of Allapattah intact by overruling Zahn, while prohibiting the
use of Rule 20 to join either nondiverse plaintiffs or plaintiffs whose
claims are of insufficient amount. By making this amendment, Congress's intent would be clear and the plain text would match that intent: § 1367 cannot be used to circumvent the complete diversity rule.
Alternatively, Congress could amend § 1367(a) to provide that
"supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties" only in the context of federal question jurisdiction under § 1331. This change would essentially
codify the distinction between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction as it
existed prior to Finley.2 5 7 It would also accord with the recommendation of the Federal Courts Study Committee to limit the joinder of
additional parties to the federal question context. 258 The net result of
this change would be to bring § 1367 more in line with the scope it

255

See Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2640 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[Section] 1367's

text defies flawless interpretation ....

256

").

28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (2000); see, e.g., Denis F. McLaughlin, The Federal Supple-

mentalJurisdiction Statute-A Constitutionaland Statutory Analysis, 24 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 849,
940-42 (1992). Congress could certainly add Rule 23 to the list as well; however,
given the great weight of scholarly consensus that Zahn was an aberration due to its
logical inconsistency with Ben-Hur, see Freer, supra note 94, at 60-61, the most sensible course would be for Congress to preserve Strawbridge in the nonclass action context by adding Rule 20 to § 1367(b) while leaving out Rule 23.
257

See supra Part I.B.1.

258

See FCSC REPORT, supra note 90, at 47-48.
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was originally claimed to have: overruling the result in Finley and mak259
ing very few other changes.
More drastically (but less likely, given the historical opposition to
such a move) 260 Congress could choose affirmatively to embrace the
more expansive view of diversity jurisdiction exemplified in its more
recent jurisdictional legislation. 26 1 It could decide that Strawbridgeis a
relic, ineffective, or otherwise no longer reflective of its preferences
for the reach of diversity jurisdiction under its statutory grants ofjudicial power pursuant to Article III. Accordingly, Congress could specifically amend the jurisdictional statutes 262 to provide for minimal
diversity as the basis of jurisdiction. 2 63 As noted, this change would
satisfy the minimum requirements of the Constitution, and would
have the additional benefit of enabling federal courts to hear cases
where there is a danger of bias against an out-of-state party even
though complete diversity is not present. 264 Congress could structure
a new "minimal diversity" requirement in one of two ways. Either
Congress could grant original jurisdiction over all claims transactionally related to a single claim between diverse parties; or, Congress
could make clear that incomplete diversity is not a bar to the exercise
of supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(a). 265 Regardless, a congressional endorsement of minimal diversity as the only citizenship
requirement would cure the Allapattah dichotomy by expressly jettisoning the two-hundred-year Strawbridgetradition that the Court was
266
reluctant to overrule on its own.

259 See H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 28 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860,
6875.
260 See supra notes 237-43 and accompanying text.
261 See supra notes 244-52 and accompanying text.
262 As it has already done in the class action context. See Class Action Fairness Act
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 4(a), 119 Stat. 4, 9-12 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)
(West Supp. 2006)).
263 See Howard P. Fink, Supplemental Jurisdiction-TakeIt to the Limit!, 74 IND. L.J.
161 (1998).
264 See supra Part IV.A.
265 This would be approximately the same result as, and is probably best effected
by, repealing § 1367(b) entirely. See Fink, supra note 263, at 161.
266 Indeed, underlying the Court's reticence to carry its statutory interpretation
rationale to its logical conclusion is, undoubtedly, an inherent institutional aversion
to interpreting broadly the scope of its own power. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text. In some sense, it seems incongruous that the Court would interpret
other sections of the Constitution applying to other branches so broadly, while maintaining a very narrow view of judicial power under Article III. Compare Gonzales v.
Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2209 (2005) (reaffirming that the power "'[t]o regulate Commerce ... among the several States,"' justifies a law's reach to "purely intrastate" and
noncommercial activity (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3)), and Dames & Moore
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Finally, and most fundamentally, Congress could abolish general
diversity jurisdiction in its entirety by repealing § 1332(a)(1), which
provides jurisdiction over run-of-the-mill cases between diverse parties.2

67

This solution clearly heads in the opposite direction of the

previous possibilities, by essentially scrapping an entire constitutional
head of jurisdiction, rather than greatly expanding it26 8 or merely
269
tinkering with the reach of the supplemental jurisdiction statute.
But the abolition of diversity jurisdiction does solve the Allapattah
problem and a whole host of other potential pitfalls in § 1367.270
Moreover, the presence of the statutes providing for diversity-based
jurisdiction in specified circumstances would, as noted, preserve federal jurisdiction over those specific categories of cases recommended
for retention by the Federal Courts Study Committee in its report that
otherwise recommended that diversity jurisdiction be abolished. 271 In
this sense, Congress has already laid the groundwork to ensure that
those cases truly situated to benefit from a federal forum will continue
to have access to that forum; the elimination of § 1332(a) (1) jurisdiction would thus affect only those cases that could just as easily be
brought in state court. 2 72 Whether one accepts the conventional justification for diversity jurisdiction or the narrower view offered by Judge
Friendly,2 73 it may well be that diversity jurisdiction for relatively simv. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 675-79 (1981) (broadly construing the President's authority
to act in the area of international affairs absent explicit authorization from Congress),
with Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) ("Federal
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by
Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree." (citations
omitted)), and Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 548 (1989) (noting that federal
courts are generally powerless to exercise their Article III power absent a statutory
grant of jurisdiction).
267 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (2000).
268 See supra notes 260-66 and accompanying text.
269 See supra notes 256-59 and accompanying text.
270 See Moore, supra note 104, at 66-67 ("Congress could make the ultimate decision to abolish general diversity jurisdiction, making this and all other versions of
§ 1367(b) moot."); see also Freer, supra note 88, at 474-86 (identifying several
problems with the statute). Even the abolition of diversity jurisdiction is not enough
to cure all the potential defects in § 1367; some problems remain with respect to
alienage and removal, which are beyond the scope of this Note. See Freer, supra note
88, at 474-75, 485.
271 See supra notes 250-52 and accompanying text.
272 See FCSC REPORT, supra note 90, at 39. But see Redish, supra note 234, at
1785-87 (arguing that docket control is not a sufficient reason for restricting jurisdiction because the federal courts exist for more substantive purposes than merely
"clearing their dockets").
273 See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
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pie state law cases that happen to involve parties of diverse citizenship
is no longer necessary, and the time has come to withdraw federal
jurisdiction over such cases.
Any of the foregoing solutions would resolve the tension in Allapattah. Any one of them would provide a clearer statement of the
intent of Congress regarding federal jurisdiction. And any one of
them would simplify the jurisdictional rules from the perspective of
the practitioner, who would need to consult neither legislative history
nor the fidelity of the Supreme Court to a particular precedent before
confidently asserting federal jurisdiction over her case. There are undoubtedly other solutions that would work as well. 2 74 Regardless of

the specific choice Congress makes, it would seem after Allapattah that
Congress cannot rely upon the Court's promise in Finley to adhere to
a "background of clear interpretive rules"' 275 when considering jurisdictional statutes.
Accordingly, if and when Congress chooses to act, it must be
painstakingly clear in its intent, ensuring that the language operates as
intended, and that there can be no mistaking whether and which jurisdictional precedents are preserved or abrogated. In short, Congress should turn Finley back on the Court, by enacting a "background
of clear statutory rules" for the Court to adjudicate against.2

76

Justice

Kennedy claimed in Allapattah that "[n] o sound canon of interpretation requires Congress to speak with extraordinary clarity in order to
modify the rules of federal jurisdiction," 2 77 but given the serious mischiefs wrought by the courts' interpretations of § 1367, it would behoove us all-including the Supreme Court-if Congress would
return to the arena and be extraordinarily clear this time.
CONCLUSION

Justice Story's belief that Congress was required to authorize federal courts to hear cases to the full extent of the Constitution's limit 278
274 For example, the American Law Institute has long had a proposed replacement version of § 1367. See AM. LAW INST., FEDERALJUDICIAL CODE REVISION PROJECT
13-16 (2004); John B. Oakley, Prospectusfor the American Law Institute's FederalJudicial
Code Revision Project, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855, 894-95 (1998).
275 Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989).
276 See FALLON ET AL., supra note 1, at 930 (noting that AM. LAW INST., supra note
274, has taken the view that "the need for clear jurisdictional rules call [s] for detailed
statutory specification").
277 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2620 (2005).
278 See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 328-30 (1816); White v.
Fenner, 29 F. Cas. 1015, 1015-16 (C.C.R.I. 1818) (No. 17,547); supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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has long since been discarded as incorrect. He would surely have
been pleased, then, with the breadth of the holding in Gibbs authorizing supplemental jurisdiction over any claim arising from a common
nucleus of operative fact with a valid federal claim. 279 But the contrary view of limited court power had become too firmly established
for Gibbs to stand unrestrained. The result of this tension in federal
jurisdiction has been a series of serious mischiefs nearly forty years in
the making. The Supreme Court's most recent contribution to this
comedy of errors in Allapattahhas laid bare the continuing inability of
the courts to bring the language of § 1367 and the principles of limited jurisdiction exemplified by the complete diversity rule into peaceful coexistence. The profound difficulties experienced by Congress
and the courts in trying to reconcile the two concepts since Finley
280
seem to suggest that "neither can live while the other survives."
Aside from the possibility of some minor amendatory tinkerings that
would eliminate the anomaly at the price of coherence, 281 the options
for meaningful resolution would lead to another major shift in the
jurisdictional statutes. Moreover, it is plain that the proverbial ball is
back in Congress's court, just as it was after Finley, albeit for different
reasons. Then, it was because the Supreme Court challenged Congress to provide the missing statutory basis for supplemental jurisdiction. Today, it is because after fifteen years of conflict, disagreement,
and rhetoric about what Congress did or did not intend with the passage of § 1367, the Supreme Court has finally told us that what Congress intended does not matter-except when it does.
Surely, Congress has something to say about that.

279 United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966); see supra notes 39-52
and accompanying text.

280 J.K. ROWLING, I-ARRY POTTER AND THE ORDER OF THE PHOENIX 841 (2003); see
also AM. LAW INST., supra note 274, at 6 ("The reconceptualization of the operation of
the rule of complete diversity cannot be avoided if a general grant of supplemental
jurisdiction is to be melded satisfactorily with retention of the complete-diversity
rule.").
281 See supra notes 256-59 and accompanying text.

